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CHAPI'ER I 
SOLID WAS'IE DISPa3AL AND RECOVERY 
A. Sro.ee"imd Perception of the Problem . 
The Envirorurental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated that 140 
million tons of solid waste are generated annually in the United States 
by both household and rormerical sources. About six .eercent of this 
post-consUITer nunicipal waste is recovered for productive uses.* The 
ranaining 94% of this material is the cause of an increasingly critical 
solid waste disposal problem. 
That FOrtion of solid waste which is not rerovered may be disfOsed 
of in any of several other rrore or less acceptable ways. At best, 
disfOsal can take place in envirorurentally sound landfills or incinerators. 
Such facilities, however, are usually the exception rather than the rule. 
It is rrore often the case that landfills are poorly designed or badly 
managed or both. Incinerators have been closed down throughout the 
country due to air pollution problems. 
In .Massachusetts eighteen incinerators have been closed because they 
did not cxxnply with air pollution regulations. Only 200 of an estimated 
350 landfills in the CbITITDnwealth rreet standards set by the Departrrent of 
Envirorurental QJality Engineering (DN;)E). Many landfills, both in and out 
of compliance with DN;)E regulations, are reaching capacity. Corrmunities 
throughout the CbITITDnwealth are faced with critical decisions about what 
to do with their solid wastes in light of stricter environrrental regulations, 
rising costs, and decreasing land availability.** 
*U.S. Envirorurental Protection Agency. Resource Rerovery and Waste Reduction 
Fourth Report to Congress. EPA Publication SW-600. Washington U.S. Coverrurent 
Printing Office, 1977. Page 1. 
*~eomronwealth of Massachusetts State Solid Waste Plan, Sept~r 30, 1977. 
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Awareness of solid waste diSEX>sal as a major enviromrental and resource 
management issue was at a relatively low level until fairly recently. 
Quite possibly this has been due to non-recognition on the part of the 
public, govermrent, and the private sector of the relationship of solid waste 
to the national energy and ma.terials streams as well as to general pollution 
control. Solid waste is a less obvious and less directly irritating fonn 
of pollution than are liquid or gaseous wastes.* 
The majority of the public's concern with solid waste disposal begins 
and ends with local rubbish pick-up or their weekly trip to the town dump. 
Afterwards it is both out of sight and out of mind. IDcal govermrents, 
until recently, did not regard solid waste disposal as a serious problem 
as long as they could accomplish it relatively cheaply in environrrentally 
questionable disposal facilities. 
The EPA's Resource Recovery and Waste Reduction Fburth Peport to 
Congress lists seven reasons for the increasing national concern with the 
solid waste problem . (here sumnarized and }?araphrased) : 
1. Growth in Municipal Solid Waste Generation. M::>re than 
~-thirds of residential and cormerical solid waste 
is cortlfOSed of manufactured products and packaging 
materials (the other third is CO:rnpJsed of sewage sludge, 
junked autos and denolition wastes). It is estimated 
that these wastes have nore than doubled since 1950. 
Thus, the sheer magnitude of post-consumer wastes has 
*John E. Bryson, "Solid Waste and Resource Recovery" in Federal Erwiromrental 
I.aw ed. Erica L. Iblgin and 'Ihornas G. P. Guilbert, St. Paul, West Publishing 
Co. 1974. 
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increased public awareness because of its influence 
on associated economic, social, and environmental 
problems. 
2. F.cological and Public Health Dama.ges from Disp;?sal. 
Traditionally public health concern regarding solid waste 
focused on incinerator emnissions and insect and rodent 
control at collection, storage, and dlD.Tlp sites. Increasingly, 
however, this concern has broadened to include the contamination 
of surface and groundwater due to both surface runoff and 
underground leachates from landfills. 'Ihis is particularly 
serious since it may rule out an aquifer as a source of 
drinking water for decades. The growing awareness of 
the need to protect water quality has significant economic 
irrplications. The cost of adequate leachate control 
at new landfills is expected to rrore than double the 
cost of disp;?sal at these facilities. 
3 • .Aesthetic Effects. Tens of millions of dollars are spent 
in the United States by local and state governments on 
street and highway litter pickups. The Cormonwealth of 
Massachusetts, in 1975, spent about $3.5 million for litter 
cleanup, ·($1,185,000. for cleanup of state highways and rest 
areas, $285,000 for cleanup of state forest and parks, and 
$2,000,000 for cleanup of ~troP?litan District Corrmission 
highways, parks, and beaches.) 'Ihese figures do not include 
the costs of local litter rem:>val and street sweeping.* 
*State Solid Waste Plan i d!.977) p.9 
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Although such figures may be an inadequate proxy of 
society's willingness to pay for an rrore pleasing 
aestheticaly environrrent, it does indicate that a 
significant value is placed u.r:on the aesthetic quality of 
the environment. 
4. Broader Environrrental Implications. An increasing arrount of 
consurrer goods in this country are single-use throw away iterrs. 
Very little of these goods are recycled. As a result, there 
is a large and growing flow of wastes. 'Ihis systerrs of 
material flows can be characterized as a "high-throughput"econOif!Y. 
Virgin material extraction and initial raw material 
ref inin9. and processing are the largest source of environrrental 
damage in this country. These activities also consurre a 
dis.r:ortionately-high arrount of energy. In contrast waste 
reduction approaches (such as the use of recyclable beverage 
containers, producing rrore durable products, and reducing arrounts 
of packaging material) produce comparatively small arrounts of 
adverse environrrental impact while significantly reducing the 
arrounts of wastes generated. In addition, technologies which 
recover energy and materials create less envirorurental damage 
and require less energy consumption than their virgin-material-
utilizing conterparts. 
Actions taken to reduce material throughput 
and recover .r:ost-consurrer residuals will thus 
generally yield envirorurental protection benefits 
throughout the economic system and not only at rm.micipal 
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solid waste sites. In effect, this represents 
substitution of low-polluting systems for high-
P?lluting systems of production and consumption.* 
5. Solid Waste Disp:?sal as an Index of Natural !€source Depletion. 
An econorqy which has a high anount of waste and a relatively 
small anount of material and energy recovery implies a high 
rate of virgin material consumption. A greater reliance on 
resource recovery would obviously conserve non- renewable resources. 
6. Direct Costs of Collection and Disposal. The direct cost of .collecting -
and disposing of an .average ton:-:-of · rro.micipal solid waste in 1976 • 
was estimated by the EPA to be about $30.00. For the U.S. as 
a wh:>le the cost was nearly $4 billion per year. It is thought 
that these costs Cbubled over the six to eight years prior to 
1976. There are several reasons for these sharply rising costs: 
general inflation, growth of the waste steam, rising land 
values, longer hauls to increasingly rrore distant disp:?sal 
sites, and the growing costs of meeting stiffer environrrental 
regulations. 
7. Public Administration Problems. Solid waste collection and disposal 
is bec:x:>nling an increasingly inp.Jrtant concern to local governments 
not only because of steadily increasing costs of collection and 
disposal, but also because of zoning problems, the need to 
locate facilities outside town or city limits and working with 
other rrnmicipalities to create regional solid waste disposal system;. 
* Resource Iecovery and Waste Reduction ••• , p. 4. 
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It can thus be seen that solid waste disposal is a far larger 
problem and one with rrore wide reaching irrplications then is corrrronly 
sup:p3sed. lbw we, as a society, regard our resources is reflected 
in how ITD.lch and 'What kinds of waste we produce and h<M it is dis:i;:osed 
of. Much can be said for long-range plans for reducing sources of 
waste. However, for the next few decades we ma.y have to make the best 
of the residuals of a thrCM""away society. Various systems for the 
recovery of wastes have been pro:i;:osed for this pur:i;:ose and will be 
discussed in Section B. 
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:S,. An Approach to Solving the Solid Waste. DiSfOSal Problan - Resource Recovery 
'Ihe U.S. EPA's Resource Recovery and Waste Reduction Fourth RefQrt 
to Congress defines resource recovery as 11 ••• a general concept referri.Ilg 
to any productive use of what would otherwise be a waste material requiring 
disfOsal. As such it encornp:isses narrower concepts such as: 
11 
'Recycling' - reprocessing wastes to recover 
an original raw material; for exarrple, the steel 
content from tin cans or the fiber content of 
wastepaper. 
11 
'.Material Conversion' - utilizing a waste 
in a different form of material, such as corcpost 
from wastepaper or road-paving material from auto 
tires. 
11 
'Energy Recovery' - capturing the heat value 
from organic waste, either by direct combustion 
or by first converting it into a interrrediate fuel 
product.* 
Resource recovery systems have the fQtential for mitigating the adverse 
effects of solid waste on the envirorurent and on the econo:rey while lavering 
the consumption of energy and material resources. large regional facilities 
reduce the number of siting decisions that need to be made and their economies 
of scale can lCMer the costs of disfOsal to individual COilll1Uilities. In areas 
such as eastern M:J.ssachusetts (on which this paper will focus) where land is 
relatively scarce and expensive and where energy costs are relatively high a 
well thought out regional resource recovery systan may be especially appropriate. 
*Ib1~ -d, 1 p • . • 
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As attractive as resource recovery DCM seems, until recently there has 
been very little stirrulus for the implementation of such systems. While 
our econcmy has prcxluced an increasing anount of waste, there has been very 
little awareness of such waste as an environmental problem or as s~tornatic 
of a p::>0r system of resource management. 
'!he historic availability of relatively cheap natural resources and 
energy in the United States has allowed resource recovery to be ignored. 
'Ihis, canbined with federal p::>licies such as tax credits which encourage 
natural resource develoµren.t and regulations such as rail freight rates 
administered by the Interstate Comnerce Corrmission which in many cases favor 
virgin over secondary materials, had created a climate inimical to the 
develoµren.t of a resource recovery industry.* 
D. How this Study is Organized 
In the following chapters an examination will be made of the Ccmronweal th 
of Massachusetts' p::>licy of solid waste management through a series of 
regional resource recovery systerrs. 'Ihese regions are COITµ)Sed of 
nrunicipalities which have voluntarily joined to seek acceptable long-tenn 
:rrethods for managing. their solid waste. 'Ihis paper will focus on the 
Massachusetts approach to solid waste management as exerrplif ied by one of 
these groups, the 128 West Resource Recovery Council (128 WRRC). Olapter II 
will follow the develoµren.t of the 'Connon-wealth's solid waste planning 
efforts from the inception of the Bureau of Solid Waste DiSp::>sal in 1969 
to the present tirre ... the evolution of the current system of voluntary regions. 
Chapter III will discuss solid waste disp::>sal in the 128 WRRC area and regional 
resource recovery as an approach to solid waste management. It will also 
*Ibid, page 5. 
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explore the theoretical background of regionalized solid waste management. 
Qiap.ter IV will describe the 128 WROC; its history, structure, and the 
pIOCesses by which sites and technologies are selected. 'lbe Corrnonwealth's 
approach to solid waste rnanageirent will be analyzed arrl the disadvantages 
and advantages of the approach will be discussed. Chapter V will of fer 
an assessment of the Corrnonwealth's rolicy to date and suggest future 
directions. 
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Chapter II 
SOLID WASTE POLICY AND PLANNING IN MASSACHUSEI'I'S 
'llris chapter will deal with the evolution of the Connonwealth of 
Massachusetts approach to solid waste from the inception of the Bureau 
of Solid Waste Disi:osal (BSWD) in 1969 to the present. Originally part of the 
Deparbnent of Public 'Vbrks, row a Division of the Deparbnent of Environrrental 
.M:inagement, the BSWD was established to coordinate solid waste planning and 
management and" •.• to assist conmmities in addressing the complex teclmical, 
institutional, procurement, and financial issues involved in ••. [solid waste 
disi:osal J . "* 
A. Initial Attempts to Create a Regional Approach 
1. '!he Raytheon Rei:ort 
'!he first rrajor planning effort took place when the Deparbnent of 
Public 'Vbrks contracted with the Raytheon Service Company to produce 
a Solid Waste .M:inagement Study Re,EX?rt which was released May 15, 1972.** 
'!he rei:ort, which evaluated the status of solid waste rranagement in 
Massachusetts rrade several reconnendations which v.ere incori:orated in the 
state plan. 
A rrajor recorrm:mdation of the "Raytheon Re,EX?rt", was the develo:prent 
of a nen-.Drk of rrandato:ry regions for handling solid waste processing and 
disi:osal throughout the state. This was based on an analysis which 
found" ••• economies attainable with a corresi:onding reduction in the anount 
of taxes needed for this service through operating solid waste rranagement 
systems on a large regional scale tto beJ a ccmpelling argurrent for 
such reqionaj..ization."*** 
*State Solid Waste Plan (1977), p.l. 
**Study of Solid Waste Disi:osal for Program Plan Developrent for the camonwealth 
of Massachusetts, Raytheon Company, Burlington, MA Ma.y 15, 1972. 
***Ibid, page 4-1 
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Another reason given had to do with the fact that highly urbanized 
areas have little or no land available for the creation of solid waste 
disi;nsal facilities. Regions · with both urban and rural comp:ments 
(as proi;nsed in the rei;nrt) w:)uld have a greater number of siting 
options. "'Ihose oorrmunities i;nssessing available land area for disi;nsal 
facilities can aid their fellav, less fortunate, oorrmunities while at the 
sane ti.Ire reducing the cost impact of their OW1n solid waste managerrent 
and conforming with applicable laws and regulations,"* That is to say, 
regionlization was prorroted as being the best approach for dealing with 
siting, eo::momic~ and environrrental difficulties SOITE or all of which were 
and are faced by all cormrunities in the Cormnnw=alth. 
2. M:mdatory :Eegions and Hone Rule 
Although state i;nlic-.1 still favors a regional approach, one elerrent 
which eventually proved fatal to the 1972 plan was the predetermined and 
mandatory nature of the proi;nsed regions. The rei;nrt recornrended that the 
Connonwealth be divided into 41 solid waste districts. 'Ihe districts 
were to be fonned by subdividing the areas served by the thirteen regional 
planning agencies (RPA's) in the state. 'Ihe districts were to be grou:p:rl 
in RPA areas which, in turn, were grou:p:rl to fo:rm four "Solid Waste 
Supervisory Units " so that the B.SWD "WOuld have a "reasonable nurrber of 
agencies" · to deal with.** Proi;nsed regions are shown in figure 1. 
Using data from the "Raytheon Rei;nrt", a state plan was develo:p:rl by 
an interagency planning unit which included representatives of the Departrrent 
of Public Works, Depart::rrent of Public Health, Departrrent of Natural Resources 
and the Depart::rrent of Cormrunity Affairs. It was this group which transfonred 
*Ibid , µ:i.ge 4-1 
**Ibid I µ:i.ge 4-11 
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the recomrendation of rrandatory regionalization into state :i;:olicy.* 
'lb understand why mandatory regionalization was doorred, it is necessary 
to understand the :i;:oli tical context in .Massachusetts. Solid waste dis:i;:osal 
is the res:i;:onsibility of each municipality. In order for the state to 
irnp:>se mandatory regionalization u:i;:on local cormnmities a :i;:ortion of their home 
rule :i;:owers 'WOuld have to have been reduced. legislation which was 
pro:i;:osed to accomplish this was defeated. 
At a SymfX>Sil.Illl on . regionalized solid waste managerrent in June 19 72, 
University of Massachusetts :i;:olitical scientist, Robert A Shanley rrade 
the following observations concerning reasons to expect such a defeat: 
.•• (M)any cormnmities in .Massachusetts and in 
other states have representatives in the lc:Mer houses of 
the legislature representing their particular cormn.mity, 
whereas there are usually no representatives of areas which 
dovetail with the roundaries of existing or pro:i;:osed 
regional districts. 'Iherefore, since rrany representatives 
in Massachusetts are considered to be, or consider them.selves 
to be delegates from a particular cormnmity and preservers 
of the life style of that cormnmity, an additional :i;:olitical 
burden is placed on those who see the need for regional 
plans to improve the life and envirornrent of the rretro:i;:olis. 
And even in those areas where a legislator represents 
a number of conmunities, in Western .Massachusetts, for 
example, there may not be the necessary pressure or 
*Coononwealth of Massachusetts. Solid Waste Managerrent Plan, Surnncu:y Rep:>rt. 
undated, c. 1972. Introducte:l!¥ letter 
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crying need for regionalization of solid waste 
facilities.* 
In 1973, House Bill #6643 was sul:mitterl. Section 19 of this bill 
arrended the authority of the Bureau of Solid Waste Disposal to allow it to: 
••• (D)esignate solid waste disposal districts 
and solid waste disposal regions ••• Solid waste disposal 
districts shall, wherever practicable, consist of a 
single city or town, or a part thereof, or tWJ or rrore 
contiguous cities and towns, or cities and towns, or parts 
thereof •••• Any city or town who, after a public hearing 
held jointly by the Depart:nent [of Public Works] and the 
Departrrent of Public Health, is found to be unwilling 
or unable to operate its solid waste disposal facility 
in canpliance with existing state laws, rules and 
regulations, including without limitation the laws, 
rules and regulatiorBrelating to operation of solid 
waste disposal facilities, air pollution, water pollution, 
wetland protection and protection of waters of the 
camonwealth shall be required to participate in 
the state program of solid waste disposal.** 
House Bill #6643, was defeaterl, as had been predicted. 'Ihis left state 
policy nakers the task of designing a regional approach than did not interfere 
with hone rule. 
*Robert A. Shanley, "I..ocal Political Systems in Relation to Regionalization" 
in Proceerlings of Regionalized Solid Waste Managerrent, Technical Guidance 
Center for Environmental Quality, Q)()perative Extension Service, 
University of M3.ssachusetts at Amherst, 1972. pp 74-75 
**Cormonwealth of M3.ssachusetts, House Representatives, #6643, May 14, 1973 
B. Voluntary Regionalizatian 
1. legislation 
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The legislation which was finally passed in 1973 rerroved the mandatory 
nature of H #6643, while allowing for voluntary groupings 0£ nrunicipalities 
for the puri::ose of solid waste disposal: 
A solid waste disposal district shall wherever 
practicable ronsist of a single tcM.n, or a part 
thereof, or ~ or rrore rontigous cities or tcM.ns, 
or cities and towns, or parts thereof, provided 
that no city or town, or part thereof shall be 
included in rrore than one said district. Each 
district shall have an advisory cx:mnittee rorrprised 
of one rrenber from each city or town in such 
district, who shall be appointed by the city 
rranager in a city having a city manager, by the mayor 
in any other city, by the selectmen in a tcM.n having 
selectmen, and by the tcM.n rouncil in any other tcM.n 
••• Unless otherwise approved by the governor, 
unburned solid waste shall not be disposed of in 
a landfill established under (these) provisions 
••• unless such unburned solid waste was generated 
within the district where such a landfill is 
located, provided, lx>wever, that solid waste or 
by-products thereof, may be freely transported 
throughout the Ccmronwealth for the purposes of 
recycling, reclamation and resource rerovery.* 
It was this provision which set the legal basis for the present system 
of regional resource recovery in Massachusetts. Al though the size, sha:i;:ie and 
*Ccmronwealth of .Mclssachusetts, Acts of 1973, Chapter 1217, Section 21. 
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rrembership of regional groupings was not specified, municipalities were allowed 
to join tog~ther tQ seek Solution$-· t0 their conm::>n\~lid waste disp::>sal prol5lerrs. 
2. The .Massachusetts Solid Waste .Management Plan of 1975 
By the ti.ma the Noverrber 1975, .Massachusetts Solid Waste .Managerrent 
Plan was pronulagated a state p::>licy featuring a system of voluntary 
regional resource recovery systems had evolved. 'lhe overall goal of the 
Cbrrrronwealth was " ••• to maximize recovery of resources fran all solid 
wastes inraneconanical and environrrentally sound manner."* 'Ihe role 
of the state becarre that of catalyst in assisting regional groups of 
rrunicipalities to fonu for the pu.q:x:>se of solving their solid waste 
disp::>sal problems.** 
'lhe overall state system was conceived as a loose and suggestive one, 
rather that the rigid and mandatory system suggested in the Raytheon 
Study: 
'Ihe need, number, size, and location of resource 
recovery facilities is a function of the volUIIE and 
geographic concentration of solid waste. Based 
on current volurres and locations of solid waste, 
it is estinated that a statewide netw:ilrk of regional 
systems can supp::>rt a mix of three large (3000 ton/day 
each) resource recovery plants and four srraller (1500 
ton/ day each) plants. Actual sizing and location of 
regional facilities can only be accorrplished after 
a detailed analysis of the waste generation and 
location, rrarkets, and transp::>rtation systerrs ••• "*** 
*Ccrmonwealth of .Massachusetts. Solid Waste .Managerrent Plan, November, 1975 
unpag.:fnated 
**Ibid 
***Ibid 
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The plan goes on to suggest general locations of plants, incorµ:>rating 
existing resource recove:ry facilities in Saugus and Fast. Bridgewater, 
which are shown in figure 2. 
The 1975 plan deliniates roles for the state, cormn.mities, and the 
private sector. 'lhe private sector was to be utilized for system 
ronstruction and operation under public rontrol. Public functions would 
include: organization, implerrentation, administration, and regulation of 
the system. Within the public sector each nrunicipality was to retain 
its primary resµ:>nsiblity for the disµ:>sal of solid waste. 'lhe state's 
role was to include resµ:>nsibility for overall organization and 
administration of the regional systems.** 
c. CUrrent Regional Solid Waste Policy 
1. 'lhe 1977 Plan Update 
'Ihe latest upj.ate of the State Solid Waste Plan was completed in 
Septerrber, 1977. It retains, intact, the regional resource recovery 
approach outlined in the 1975 plan.*** 
Although the present system of regionalization is not rnandato:ry the 
state retains soma leverage over the nrunicipalities. 'Ihe Division of 
Air and Hazardous .Materials (DAHM) of the Departnent of Enviro:rurental 
Quality Engineering (DEQE) , under the provisions of Section 150A of 
Chapter 111 of the General Laws of Massachusetts," ••• continuously 
.oversees and routinely inspects existing solid waste disi:osal facilities, 
*Ibid 
**Ibid 
***camonwealth of .Massachusetts, 1977 9£· cit. 
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examines pro:i;osed sites and expansion of existing sites for the disposal 
of solid waste, ••• and detennines whether the assigrurent of such facilities 
should be rrodified or rescinded."* If the DAHM finds that a rrrunicipal 
facility is not being operated in compliance with its regulations 
it can have the Office of the Attorney Ceneral issue orders to force 
compliance. Cities and towns so ordered, or under threat of such orders 
are in need of economically feasible alternatives. 
State r:olicy has evolved from the beginnings of official recognition 
in the late 1960's that the state has a role in solid waste management 
(as distinquished from regulation) to the present system of state 
assisted voluntary regionlization. 'Ihe present policy errerged after 
the attempt to iinpJse mandatory regions proved to be politically infeasible. 
While it will be seen in this paper that there are problems with the 
current approach, these are also a nurrber of advantages. 
2. 'Ibwards Implementation - The 128 West Resource Recovery Council 
'Ihe 128 West Resource Recovery Council (128 WRRC) is one of several 
regional groups of rrunicipalities in Massachusetts organized to provide 
a solid waste disr:osal alternative for its rrerrbers. Sorre rrember conm.mities may 
be under orders from the Ati:tomey .Ceneral, to oonply with state regulations, 
such orders may be threatened or pending, sorre corrmunities may be running 
out of space in their landfill, their disposal costs may be increasing, 
they may suffer from a corrbination of these problems, they may sirrply 
wish to rraximize their future options, or there may be a combination 
of such factors. The state system of voluntary regional resource recovery 
groups such as 128 WRRC was devised to offer a viable alternative for 
*Ibid 
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these corrmunities. Subsequent chapters of this paper will discuss 
the manner in \'.hich the solid waste disposal needs of corrmunities in 
Massachusetts are addressed through groups such as the 128 WRRC. 
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Chapter III 
Regional Fesource Recove:ry 
A Background and Discussion 
In this Chapter an attempt will be made to examine sorre of the 
factors which have influenced the Connonwealth's approach to regional 
solid waste disposal. The 128 West Fesource Recove:ry Council ( 128 WRRC) 
has been selected as an example of a state sponsored resource recove:ry 
project for several reasons: It is nore recent than the first state-
sponsored regional project, the l'brtheastern Solid Waste Project, 
and thus has benefitted from the lessons learned from this experience; 
of the remaining projects (others are in regions surrounding Springfield and. 
Worcester) the 128 WRRC has progressed the furthest toward implementation; 
and the nature of the region is interesting in its hete:rogeneity, 
enconpassing urban, suburban, and rural connrunities. 'Ihe chapter will 
first discuss the present rreans of land disposal of solid wastes used 
by nost 128 WRRC rrerrber corrmunities. There will then be a discussion 
of alternatives to land disposal, specifically resource recove:ry. 
Finally this chapter will take up the issue of regional approaches to 
resource recove:ry. 
A. Current Solid Waste Disposal Practices and Their Costs 
The 128 WRRC is a group of corrmunities in the Boston M=tropolitan 
Area whicil have joined together in seeking a regional solution to their 
mutual solid waste disposal problems. The corrmunities involved va:ry 
greatly in size and character. 'Ihe region includes an-,large city, Boston 
(population 600,000); sr:naller urban centers such as carrbridge 
(102,000), Newton (86,657), and. Waltham (60,000); 
r 
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suburban cormumities such as Natick (33,000), Wellesley (27 ,000), and 
Weston (14,000); and rural ·cormumities such as st:Ow (5,-000), 
Sheroorn (4,310), and Boxborough (2,756). 
At present, virtually all of the 128 WRRC cormumities disµ:>se 
of their solid wastes in landfills, sorre cbrmumity owned and operated, 
others run by the private sector. What m:my of the land disµ:>sal facilities 
have in commn is that they are run in violation of .Massachusetts landfill 
regulations.* 
Another problem affecting corrmunities of the region is that even 
in those landfills which are run in an enviroru:rentall y sourrl m:mner, 
capacity is finite. In ten, five, or fewer years cormumities with their 
own larrlfills will either have to find a new enviroru:rentally acceptable site, 
or contract to have their waste disp:?sed of outside of their oorders. 
The first alternative is often physically .i.mi;:ossible in the rrore developed 
p:rrts of the region, and p:?litically or economically not feasible 
even where land exists. 'Ihus, in virtually all of the 128 WRRC nrunicipalities, 
land disp:?sal of solid waste is now, or can expected to be in the near 
future, a serious fiscal, environrrental, and µ:>litical problem. 
The costs of land disp:?sal vary greatly in the 128 WRRC region. For 
example, the 'Ibwn of Sherborn pays about $23.63 ~r ton as compared to the 
. -
Tc:mn of ~ield whiclmpays about $4.45 per ton.** 
There can be a number of reasons for such disparities. In sorre 
cases towns reµ:>rt lower costs because t hey fail to account for all cost. factors. 
Techniques of collection and disµ:>sal differ from locality to locality. 
*Cormonwealth of .Massachusetts(Bureau of Solid Waste DiSµ:>sal ) and the 
MITRE Corµ:>ration, 128 West Resource Recovery Council Status Rep:?rt 
January, 19 78 • (Appendix IV) • . 
**Ibid. , p.4·8-49 
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Often, however, lower disp:>sal costs are a filllction of environrrentally 
illlSOund disp:>Sal practices. 
An increasing arrount of pressure f rorn the DEX)E is being brought 
to bear as federal funding enables that agency to increase its 
level of enforcerrent efforts. Specifically, the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) **mandates each state to conduct an 
"open dump inventory". 'Ibis process calls for each land disp:>sal 
facility to be examined against criteria to be pramilgated by the EPA. 
In Massachusetts DEX)E's Division of Air and Hazardous Materials 
(DAHM) will have the resp:>nsibility for carrying out the open dump 
inventory. It is expected that this comprehensive inspection will 
force many rrn.micipalities in the Cormonwealth to abandon inexpensive 
but environrrentally unsound :rrethods of waste disp:>sal thus increasing 
the demand for acceptable alternatives. 
*Ibid, (appendix IV) • 
**Public law 94-580 
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B. An Alternative to land Disposal 
From the prospective of rmmicipalities (which, it should be 
rerrenbered, have responsibility for solid waste disposal in M:lssachusetts) 
an acceptable alternative would be one which would simultaneously 
satisfy state and federal regulations and have a relatively attractive 
price tag. While the DN;)E has been exerting steadily increasing en-
forcement pressures on nunicipalities, another branch of state goverrurent, 
the Bureau of Solid Waste Dispos~ has been engaged in providing an 
overallconceptmalfr~rk and specific technical assistance to 
rmmicipa.lities for develo:pnent alternatives (see Chapter II) . 
1. Resource Recovery 
There are a mn11ber of factors which make resource recove:ry a 
particularly attractive approach to solid waste disposal in M:lssachusetts: 
It is not larrl intensive as are the traditional dumps and landfills; large regional 
facilities require fewer politically difficult and, at tiiiTE:'\-environrrentally 
, 
dubious siting decision..c;; the types of systems being seriously considered 
produce, as their major output, energy1 an especially valuable cormodity 
in New England with its high dependence on expensive irrg;:;orted oil; 
an.a there is the pro~se that resource rec0ve:ry can 'keep disposal costs 
to cxmmmities stable over a relatively long period. 
It may be useful at this point to describe sorre of the major types 
of technologies which will be considered by the 128 WRRC*: 
*'lllis discussion is based, in pa.rt, on material from: Steven J. Ievey, 
and Gregor H. Rigo Resource Recove:ry Plant Irrplerrentation: 
Guides for Municipal Officials : Technologies, (SW-157.2)) Washington 
D. C., Environrrental Protection Agehcy 1976.; and the 128 West Resource 
Recove:ry Council Status Report (Section I) 
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• Waterwall Incineration. In this process steam is generated 
by burning the bulk wastes as delivered to the facility. Steam is created 
from water which is circulated through the area of combustion in a nurrber 
of tubes. Steam can then be sold directly to a nearby manufacturer or it 
can be converted to electricity which, in turn, typically can be sold to 
markets such as electric utilities. 'Ihe sale of steam is p:>tentially nore 
lucrative since it involves less energy loss and there_ is no need to insert 
in generating equiµrent. However, the direct sale of steam necessitates 
the market be very close. Thus as a practical natter, it is often necessary 
to sell electricity at a lower return per unit of waste incinerated. 
Waterwall incineration is the best proven of the energy recovery technologies. 
Such systems have been successfully operated in Europe for nore than twenty 
years, and nore recently in the United States at sites such as the one in 
Saugus, Massachusetts. The reliability of waterwall incineration makes it 
a relatively attractive choice for municipalities. It does have disadvantages, 
however, such as the need for nearby markets (even electricity markets should 
be relatively close to prevent excessive transmission loss) high capital cost, 
and the relatively law value of naterials typically recovered by this 
process (i.e. the p:>st - incineration recovery of ferrous metals). 
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• Refuse Derived Fuel (RFD). Refuse derived fuel 
or RDF is a less proven but i;otentially rrore flexible technology 
than wate:rwall incineration. FDF1 is made from the oombustible 
i;ortion of solid waste after it has undergone a separation process. 
The combustible fraction is pulverized and made into either a 
confetti-like, IXJvrlery, or f iberous fuel mich can then be 
marketed to utilities or industries as a supplerent to ooal 
or oil in existing boilers. While this system is i;otentially 
less capital intensive that wate:rwall iinc±neration, and the 
location of the plant is less of a limiting factor, RDF is not a 
fully derronstrated tecl:m:>logy, hence, it presents a greater 
risk. 
• Pyrolysis. Pyrolysis is a process in which the 
combustible fraction of the refuse is subjected to heat in the 
absence of oxygen to oonvert it to a low B'IU gas, or an oil-
like liquid. '!his process has many of the sane advantages as 
IDF'l but is the least technically reliable process, at this 
tine, of the three di scussed here. 
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Each of the energy reoovery technologies is carrpatible with 
material reoovery and it is assurred that the system chosen by the 128 
WROC will include this OOrrJEOnent. The rrost readily marketable materials 
include ferrous metals, glass and aluminum. 
2. rmpacts of Resource Recovery Systems 
Resource reoovery can be expected to create a nunber of p:>sitive 
and negative direct and indirect impacts which are discussed in the 
128 West Resource Recovery Council Status Rep:>rt. 'Ihese include: 
• Payrrents Lieu of Taxes 
'Ihis is a direct benefit, mandated by state law, which requires 
a pa.yrrent of one dollar per ton of refuse to the oorrmuni ty in which the 
facility is sited. In a system which takes in 2000 tons of refuse per 
day(if one assumes BlO days of operation per year) $620,000 :per 
year would go to the host camrunity. 
• Regional F.cx:momies of Scale Versus Transp:>rtation Costs 
Because the system will be a regional one, oosts to individual 
oorrmunities will be reduced as rrore oorrmunities participate. 'Ihere i~, 
however, a limiting factor to this benefit - the increase of transp:>rtation 
oosts as the size of the region increases. 
Studies by the MITRE Coqoration (an independent, non-profit 
oonsulting finn retained by the Bureau of Solid Waste Disp:>sal to render 
technical assistance for projects such as 128 WRRC) have sh<:Mn " ••. that 
transp:>rt of solid waste over distances of 40 miles or rrore can be 
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'economically feasible,' when ronsidering these three key questions 
relating to eronomic feasibility: 
(1) 'Ihe benefits of eronomies of scale in processing 
achieved by having a larger quantity of solid 
waste available for processing. 
(2) 'Ihe alterna-bive rost for solid waste disposal 
by whatever other option is available locally, 
considering also projections about increases in 
this rost. 
(3) 'Ihe rranner in which overall regional costs of 
solid waste transport, processing and disposal is to 
be apportioned.* 
In the case of the 128 WRRC, it is assurred that the trans:i::ortation 
rosts will not increase with plant size as quickly as processing costs 
decrease. Therefore, the total rosts of processing and transportation 
is expected to decrease as plant size increases.** 
• local Dnployrrent 
'Ihe construction of a resource recovery plant is expected to 
generate about 600 to 700 mm-years of employrrent over a ~ to three 
year period. Dep:mding u:i::on the type of process selected and the size 
of the facility from 50 to 100 permmant jobs should result from resource 
recovery system operations.*** 
* Steven G. Iewis, "Regionalism: Its Ible in Resource Recovery"in Proceedings 
of the Fifth National Congress in Waste Managerrent Technology 
and Resource and Energy Recovery, Washington, D.C. U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1977. P. 174 
**128 West Resource Rerovery Council Status Re:i::ort p. 30 
***Ibid p. 30 
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• Indirect Benefits 
The 128 WRRC expects that a :multiplier affect may result from 
sare of the inrorre produced by the facility being spent in the host conmunity 
in tum, attract additional cx:mnerce and f!rployinent. to the locality.* 
• Increased Traffic 
A large .resource rerovery facility, with acapacity of 1000 tons 
per day or nore, can be expected to generate a large arrormt of traffic 
from trucks rraking refuse deliveries. A 1700 tan per day facility, 
for example can. be expected to produce a traffic level of 300 vehicles 
per day. 
There are several steps which can be taken to minimize adverse 
effects (rongestioo, mise, and p::>llution from exhaust furres) caused 
by such a traffic volurre. These include proper scheduling of deliveries, 
proper design of access roads and refuse receiving areas, the location 
of transfer facilities to enable the ronsolidatioo of loads of refuse 
into fewer trucks, and the location of facilities near major highways 
to minimize traffic through host .. ce.mruni'hy« J;P~, or those of 
other nearby ronmunities.** 
• Environrrental Impacts 
There are a number of p::>ssible environrrental impacts which may 
result from the irrplerrentation of a resource recovery system. While 
the degree of .impacts will vary with the specific technology used, in 
general such a system will have p::>tential .impacts relating to air quality 
noise, o<br, water effluents, and the disp::>sal of residue. While 
* Ibid, p.30 
** Ibid, p. 30-31 
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these :i;:ossible negative side effects should not be lightly regarded, 
there is reason to believe that they can be kept within acceptable limits. 
When done properly, it is reasonable to assume that a resource recovery 
system will be environmentally far superior to traditional land dis:i;:osal 
methods.* 
c. Regional Approaches to Solid Waste .Managerrent 
1. 'Ihe Need for :R:gional Organization 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's awareness of the nature and 
magnitude of the solid waste probl€m grew. Alternative methods 
were prop:>sed to nore satisfactorily deal with waste. However, as was 
mentioned earlier is this p:i.per, the new approaches prop:>sed arec. complex 
and capital intensive. Even ne.N, enviro:nrrentally sound, landfill techniques 
such as special preparation of landfill areas and various types of pre-disp:>sal 
treabnent of the wastes, were found to be far costlier than conventional 
methods. 
Jane Gilbert has found that: 
P.s techn:>logy improves and the need for 
nore efficient systems of disposal rises, it is 
likely that even nore expensive facilities will be 
required. (The current .rx:>pularity of transfer 
stations and recycling plants are evidence of this 
trend.) 'Ihus, the small nunicip:i.lity is likely to 
*'Ihe enviro:nrrental aspects of a large scale waterwall incineration resource 
recovery system is discussed at length in the lDraft Environmental Impact 
Eep:>rt on the Northeastern Massachusetts Resource Recovery Project -
prep:i.red by the Massachusetts Bureau of Solid Waste Dis:i;:osal with the 
assistance of the MITRE Corp:>ration in June,1978. 
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find it increasingly ••• difficult to lildertake 
effective action alone in the future.* 
2. Theoretical and Practical Constraints on Regional Organization 
In a forward to an article published by EPA in 1971**,Richard D. 
Vaughan, then l\..."'ting Corrmissioner of EPA's Solid Waste Management Office, 
r:cinted out a major obstacle,,lack of organization definition: 
•.. (T)here has been considerable discussion about 
mat organizational .fonn a solid waste managemmt system 
should take. It is obvious from even a cursory 
study that rrost solid waste managerrent systems have 
been operated b.aphaza.l?dly and scarcely deserve to be 
called "systems" because resr:cnsibilities are so 
fragrrented. 'Ihe lack of a proper organizational frarrllii!rork 
having adequate IXJWer at an overall jurisdictional 
level adds to the problem. It is clear, therefore, 
that one of the rrost inµ>rtant ways to solve solid 
waste problems is to define and structure an effective 
and efficient system and to set it within an 
appropriate overall organizational frarrev.Drk. 
Gilbert found that a c:onnon therre of several studies she examined 
was that due to their r:clitical fragrrentation, rretror:clitan areas were 
unable to solve sare of rrore pressing problems they face.*** Fragrrentation, 
according to Gilbert, leads to inefficiencies for several reasons: 
*Jane ·G.:iiabert, Efforts at Intennunicipal Cooperation for Solid Waste. 
RSRI Discussion Paper Series: No. 68, Philadelµria, Regional Science 
Institute, CCtc:Der, 1973, page 9. 
**Richard O. 'Ibftrier, and Ebbert M. Clark, Intergovernmental l':pproaches to 
SOlr d-Waste .Managemm~ Forward by Richard D. Vaughan, Ier:crt #SW-4 7ts, 
Washington D.C.: :U.S. -EPA, 1971. 
***Efforts at Intermunicipal c6ordination for Solifil Waste P· 1. 
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• Providing for small conrnunities, services for which 
there are economies of scale, results in high unit costs. 'lhus, 
fragrrentation can lead to relatively high costs for such services. 
• Decisions rnade (or not made) by one unit of governrrent 
often produce externalities. 
• Where there are externalities, affected groups should have 
a voice in the decisions rnade. When there are two or nore separate 
governrrents in an area this does not occur. "(C)hoices in metro:i;:olitan 
areas tend to be res:i;x:msive only to a subset of all persons affected by 
a problem."* 
'lhe notion of a single metropolitan governrrent as an alternative 
to fragrrentation is also found by Gilbert to have dif ficulities since 
both exterHalities and economies of scale vary from one service 
to another. A single rretro:i;:olitan governrrent could lead to inefficiencies 
from the provision of services either on too large or too small a scale. 
With regard to externalities, a decision making unit should include 
all those affected by a decision, but no others, since unaffected persons 
could easily make capricious choices. In addition, a single r'retro:i;:olitan 
governrrent could tend to minimize freedom of choice by the imp::>sition of a 
single standard.*x 
Gilbert concludes that, in many cases, the best level of organization 
nay be somewhere between a single rrunicipality and 911 ··.entire met.rO:(x:>li.tan 
*Ibid f p.3 
**Ibid I p.5 
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region in size. Often, it may be optimal for a nurrber of nrunicipalities 
to coordinate their activities and to provide them jointly.* The 
manner in vtiich the 128 WRR: was fonned as such a sub-rretrop:>litan region 
will be discussed later in this paper. 
'Ibftner and Clark state that the magnitude of an ideal solid waste 
region, and what defines it is not clear. 11 ••• (W)hatever the criteria 
used -- geograpric, derrographic, hydrological, economic, or corrmuni ty 
of interest -- regions will include several contigious p:>litical 
entities and will inevitably present an intergovernmental problem if 
functional unification is atternpted. 11 They argue from this that 'the problem 
is 11 nore one of intergovernrrental coordination than regionalism. 11 ** 
'As the Massachusetts experience has shc:Mn, the atternpt to i.rrq;x:)se 
regions on the rrunicipalities of the state was viewed as by them an 
arbitrary abridgerrent of local perogative (see Chapter II). Clearly, 
whatever theoretical rrerits those mandatory regions processed, without 
local assent they were of little value. Hen9e, given the p:>litical 
context of l'·Ma.Ssachusetts, 'Ibftner and Clark's emphasis on intergovernmental 
coordination makes a good deal of sense. 
3. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Delocalized Approaches to 
Solid Waste Managerrent 
'As has been suggested by the foregoing discussion, there has been 
a great deal of discussion and sorre attempts at .irrplerrentation of 
approaches to solid waste disp:>sal involving nore than one corrmuni ty. For 
the sake of inclusiveness such approaches will be referred to as delocalized 
*Ibid ' p.7 
**Intergovernrrental Approaches ••• p.l 
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rather than regional or intergoverrurental. 
One tyte of delocalized approach which is frequently discussed 
is an authority with the mission of providing services to municipalities. 
According to Hudson 11 ••• (s)uch an authority would be able to achieve 
economies of scale in its operation to reduce the total cost to society, 
and ~uld also have rrore chance of success in using desirable sites 
since local opr:osition ~uld be less effective."* With regard to the 
last r:oint, Hudson elaborates that many corrmunities have rrajor difficulties 
locating= S0lid waste facilities =ven through those facilities are beneficial 
to residents of the comm.mi ty in general. Hudson also r:oints out 
significant advantages such an authority ~uld bring about through 
regionalization,especially that of lowering costs.** 
Gross has sumnarized the advantages of a delocalized approach as 
follows: 
F.conomic 
F.conomies of scale in processing and disr:osal 
facilities might lead to lower capital and operating 
costs for overall system. 
Larger base of supr:ort for financing high 
capital invesbrents for rrodern facilities. 
Enviro:nrrental 
Special equiprent for protecting the enviro:nrrent 
becomes economically feasible for larger facilities. 
larger land base for selection of suitable 
*aames .F. Idudso:o,"'Ihe Need for Continued local Control OVer Solid Waste 
Management", unpublished paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1973 p.5 
**Ibid ' p.6 
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sites for facilities. 
Reduces tlae "critical" nature of the solid 
waste management problem and thereby eliminates 
rationale for haphazard solutions. 
Political 
Reduce the de:pendence uµ:>n private industry 
for solutions. 
Felieve local officials of a sensitive µ:>litical 
issue. 
Social 
Eliminate the absolute need for "organized crime" in 
solid waste managerent.* 
Al.though the advantages of a delocalized approach are obvious, 
there have been disadvantages observed in a delocalized authority. 
Hud;,son defines a delocalized authqrity as "a mission - oriented body 
with a resµ:>nsibility of providing solid waste processing and disµ:>sal 
service to users in thP c;tate ••• "** Such an authority would also 
be undet'stood to have µ:>wer 0f eminent doma.in and, as such, be 
free from the rontrol of l~l zoz:iing.*** 
. ArIDng~ the disadvantages of a delocalized authority cited by Hudson 
is the µ:>tential for disruption of local land use plans. Another 
problem, he µ:>ints out, is the µ:>ssibili-t:Y of .preemption where it 
berorres i_rnp:)ssible for a .riumicipality to regulate solid waste within in 
its borders.even if state regulation is not enforced. A third issue listed by 
"'Frederick P. Gross, Issues in the Fegionalization of Solid Waste 
Man'a[ernent Planning. Feµ:>rt R75-26 carnbridge, MA: Departrrent of 
civil Engineering, Civil Engineering Systems Laboratory, .Massachusetts 
Institute of Techrnlogy, 1975 . , p.151 
**!!The Need for Continued I.ocal Control ••• " p.12 
***Ibid , p.12 
-36-
Hudson deals with implementation. The very existence or even 
likelihcxxi state authority oould rerrove whatever incentive a local 
governrrent might have for solving its own problems.* 
Hudson finds perogatives such as zoning especially vulnerable to 
mission - oriented agencies ". . • who give scant oonsiderations to 
sorre of the irrpacts of their actions"** He makes an analogy with 
other mission-oriented agencies such as those used to develop the 
Interstate Highway System. At first, roads were designed and oonstructed 
under this program based ur:on a relatively narrow definition of mission. 
Later, although implementing agencies retained their legal authority, 
r:olitical opr:osition has blocked rrost of their efforts. 
Thus we seem to have~ cases: either. the 
mission gets acoomplished to the exclusion of ot..'-:.er 
objectives; or, even with legal authority available , 
the mission does not get accomplished because of r:olitical 
opposition from irrpacted groups, no matter how 
necessary the road to the general r:opulation.*** 
"Whatever the advantages of a mission-oriented solid waste authority 
at a level beyond the local, there is reason to expect that such 
agencies often bear the seeds of their own undoing. In fact, as can 
be seen from the Massachusetts attempt to irrq;x:>se regions (Cllapter II), 
r:olitical opr:osition can prevent such agencies from ever starting. 
*Ibid ' p.12-13 
**Ibid , p.14 
***Ibid , p.14 
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Gross has found an even wider array of disadvantages to a regional 
approach, 'Which include, but go beyond those disadvantages described 
in Hudson's discussion of regional authorities: 
&onomic 
Costs associated with implementation may be 
high if objections exist to prq:x:>sed regionalization. 
Higher trans:t0rt costs. 
Possible need for transfer stations. 
Environrnental 
Impacts of solid waste dis:t0sal can becorre 
concentrated in one area especially those from 
increased trucking and leachate in the case of landfills . 
Large powerful agencies are difficult to regulate 
and they often loose sight of multiple objectives.* 
Political 
(The overridin<il; • • • of local land use controls 
may result l[iri the} • • • inability to react to ••• 
sensitive [environmental] issue. (sJ. 
Antagonism between sorre local governrnents and 
state or regional authorities may becorre ver:y 
aggravated. 
Social 
IEss imput from people (the public] in planning 
solid waste management as well as other irnfortant land-use decisions.** 
*This calls to mind the Tennessee Valley Authority 'Which, although it 
is an agency of the sane Federal Governrnent as the Environrnental 
Protection Agency, is a notorious :t0lluter. 
**Issues in the Regionalization of Solid Waste Management Planning, p.152 
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4. Requirem:mts for a Sormd Approach to Regional Resource Recovery 
It is rx>ssible to extract several of the rx:>ints di"'cussed in this 
chapter to ffi:lke a list of questions with which a resource recovery 
project might be evaluated: 
1. !bes the approach provide " ••• a proper organizational frarrework 
having adequate rx>wer at an overall jurisdictional level •.• " 
(Vaughan in Toftner and Clark). 
2. !bes the approach 'M'Jrk at an appropriate level between local 
fragnentation and a single :rretrorx:>litan entity? (Gilbert) 
3. !bes the approach avoid the dang~&< · of single mission 
authorities? (Hudson) 
4. !bes the approach provide the advantages listed by Gross and 
how well does it deal with Gross' : list of disadvantages? 
In Chapter IV, the 128 WRRC will be described in rrore detail. 
Its organization, structure, and its rrovem:mt toward implem:mtation 
will be discussed, and it will be evaluated in terms of the 
questions rx>sed in this chapter. 
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Chapter IV 
The 128 West Resource :recovery Council 
,,,An Example of the ·Massachusetts 
ApproaCh to Regional solid Waste Dis:rnsal 
A. The Organization and Progress of 128 WRRC 
The 128 West Resource Recovery Council (128 WRRC) was fonred 
by civic leaders and interested citizens in the West Suburban Boston 
Area in the spring and surrrrer of 1975. Responding to the increasing 
costs of existing solid waste disposal practices, 23 connrunities of 
the 34 initially contac~ed joined the 128 WRRC. This initial organization 
took place with the assistance of the Bureau of Solid Waste Disposal 
(BSWD) * 
The 128 WRRC errbodies the Camonwealth's approach to regional 
resource recovery which is described in .. Chapter II. It is voltmtary 
in nature, lx>th in the sense that municipalities rray or rray not choose 
to affliliate themselves with the Council, and in the sense that the 
corrnunity representatives who make up the 128 WRRC are often private 
citizens, volunteering their tine. (Sorre municipal officials participate 
directly in Council activities as well). 
1. Events Leading to Irrplenentation 
The princi pal accorrplishrrents of the 128 WRRC during the first 
tw::> and half years of its existence were the formulation of its structure 
and bylaws and the develo:prent of a planning approach to irrplenent a 
resource recovery system. This approach was an adaptation of that 
*128 WRRC Status Report, p.16 
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presented in the 1975 State Plan (see Chapter II). 
The 128 West Status Report (p. 35) set forth several basic oonditions 
to be rret before a resource recovery system could be irrplercented. Given 
the decision on the part of the 128 WRRC to open the design, oonstruction, 
and operation of such a system to oorrpetitive proposals by private 
industry it was detennined that there Illl.lSt be: 
- A perceived solid waste disposal problem 
which rrust be solved. 
- A potential market (or narkets) for resource 
recovery products. 
- An available conmitted supply of nrunicipal 
refuse tonnage requiring processing and disposal. 
- One or rrore resource recovery sites ••• 
- A viable approach for project financing. 
As related in Chapter III, there is rrost definitely a perceived 
solid waste disposal problem throughout the region. It can be expected 
that this perception will becorre increasingly vivid as oonventional 
options grow rrore expensive and difficult. 
Given the perception and, indeed, the reality of the solid waste 
disposal problem in the 128 WRRC region, there is a potential for 
sufficient tonnage to support a facility of 2000 to 3000 tons per day 
or rrore capacity.* 
*Ibid, Table Ill - 1 and III - 6 
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The conmibrent of this tonnage will take place after a contractor has 
been selected. 'Ihis can be expected to be one of the rrost difficult 
stages of the project since corrnn.mities will be expected to make long-
tei:m (20 Year) corrrnibrents of their solid wastes. 
A study was conducted on behalf of the 128 WRRC by the BSWD and its 
consultant, the MITRE Corp::>ration, to detei:mine p::>tential markets • 
The conclusion of this sttrly was that the sale of electricity to 
utilities is the rrost practical energy sales option. While rnarkets 
for recovered rraterials were also examined, it was detei:mined that 
these were not as crucial to economic success as energy rnarkets.* 
It is expected that the financing of a resource recovery system 
will be accomplished through tax-exempt revenue b::>nds issued by the 
oost ccmruni ty Is Industrial Developrent Finance Autlnri ty. 'lhe 
advantage of this approach is that it does not require the full faith 
and credit of the oost comm.mity but rather depends on revenues 
produced by the system. 'lhe financial liability of each cormnmity, 
including the oost comm.mity, is limited only to their conmibrent to 
supply a minimum anount of refuse tonnage over a period of twenty years. 
The details of a financing arrangerrent will be part of a oontractual 
arrangerrent reached between each oonmunity and whichever finn is 
selected as oontractor.** 
*Ibid p.31 
**Ibid p. 31 
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2. Site Selection 
'!he selecticn of a site, not unexpectedly, turned out to be a long 
and involved process. It began, fo:mally, when in N:>verrber, 1975 
the Teclmical Cbrrmittee of the 128 WRRC invited each participating 
col11Tllll1.ity to submit site nominations. '!he final deadline for 
nominations was in April 1977, at which tine the 128 WRRC selected four 
sites for further analysis by the Bureau of Solid Waste Dis:i;osal.* 
It is interesting to note that the site nomination process took 
nearly one and a half years. Martha Stone, a fonrer Vice Chairman 
of the 128 WRRC, is of the opinion that the rate of progress of the 
128 WRRC has been directly pro:i;ortional to the degree of assistance 
rendered by the Bureau of Solid Waste Dis:i;osal.** '!he BSWD's staffing 
was such that relatively little tine was devoted to the 128 WRRC 
until November,1977 when the staff of that agency was exparlded. 
'!he progress since that tine has been Im.lch rrore rapid. 
'!he four sites selected for further analysis were in Bedford, 
Sharon, Stoughton, and Weston. 'lhese sites had each rret the preliminary 
criteria of accessibility and availability. In the BSWD's rrore 
detailed analysis, each site was reviewed from the perspective of 
envi:ronrrental impacts (e.g., air quality, water quality, noise impacts), 
economic impacts (e.g. , :i;otential for the develoµrent of steam markets, 
adherence to the Cbnnonwealth's economic develoµrent process) and other 
*Ibid p.67 
**Interview . July 1978 
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criteria such as zoning, whether there existed a nearby backup landfill, 
access, and perhaps the rrost i.nµ:)rtant of all criteria, p:ilitical 
feasibility. 
Each site was rated from zero to four for each of the criteria 
based up:m the following system: 
0 - site unacceptable for that criteria (sic) 
1 - site acceptable but only under limited 
conditions or rrodifications related to 
that criteria (sic) 
2 - site acceptable but .i::oor choice based on that 
criteria (sic) 
3 - adequate based on that criteria (sic) 
4 - good chJice based on that criteria (sic)* 
The site analysis slx:iwed all of the sites to be roughly comparable, 
with ame exception. Stoughton had the only site which rret the test of 
p:>litical feasiblity. Sharon was rated "?" at the tirre because the 
town rreeting which eventually rejected the use of the site for resource 
recovery had not been held. Weston was rated "l" because their Board 
of Selecbnen said they wanted to wait until a detailed prop:isal was 
presented. This was satisfactory because the corrpetetive prop:isal 
process is an open one and the 128 WRRC had detennined that a site 
soould be selected prior to a specific prop:isal. Bedford was rated "l" 
*Ibid .. p. 89 
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because there appeared to be no expression of citizen supi;x::>rt. Only 
Stoughton, with a rating of "3", was found to be ix>litically feasible.* 
3. Political Difficulties in Siting Resource Fecovery Facilities 
'Ihe Co:rmonwealth has becorre especially sensitive to the issue of 
ix>litical feasiblity because of the difficulties encountered in the 
N:>rtheastern Fesource Recovery Project. In that case the City of 
Haverhill had originally agreed to be the host connrunity for the pro{X>sed 
resource recovery facility. I.Deal ix>litical op{X>sition developed, 
ostensibly on the grounds that such a facility would be environrrentally 
hazardous. The City Council, in resix>nse to this op{X>sition, voted 
to rescind Haverhill' s host status. 
There was a wide-spread belief arrong rrembers of the Northeastern 
Solid Waste Conmittee (NESWC,then the Greater I.a.wrence Solid Waste 
Ccmnitee,GISWC) that the Haverhill City Council's vote had ix>litical 
overtones going beyond the rrerits of the project. John Albis, then 
the Chainran of the GISWC, was quoted as saying, "The issue is a 
ix>litical football in Haverhill because of the upcoming election."** 
Alden Cousins, who was at that tirre the Director of the BSWD, also felt 
that the issue had becorre highly ix>liticized. It had not only bec6rre 
the "ix>litical football" that Mr. Albis had referred to but that there 
was the {X>ssibility that sorre of the opix>sition was inspired by backers 
of competing projects.*** 
*Ibid. p.90 
**Lawrence Susskind and Richard Newcorre. 'lhe Obstacles to Regional 
Resource Recovery: A Massachusetts Case Study. Environrrental Irrpact 
Assessrrent Project, laboratory of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Decerrber, 1977. 
***Interview, September, 1978. 
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After the initial rejection by the City Council, elections were 
held and the new Mayor and Council agreed to reconsider Haverhill's 
status. A public hearing was held on this matter, following which 
the new City Council agreed ito resurre host status. Political opi::osition 
once again was rrounted in the f o:rm of a referendum in which voters 
overwhelmingly opi::osed the project. 'Ihis caused the City Council to 
again rescindHaverhill 's host status. Eventually, the site was shifted 
to a i::olitically no.re oospitable corrmunity., N:>rth Andover. 
Much of the dif f iculcy in Haverhill can be traced to the unusual 
i::olitical situation there. 'Ihis, at least, is the view of the BSWD.* 
Suskind and Newcorre feel that the difficulty was, in large part, inherent 
in the Camonweal th' s approach. 'Ihese authors claim that their case 
study suggest " ••• host officials are likely to have difficulty coping 
with the technical issues (intertwined with the i::olitical judgements) 
that have to be made in siting a resour~ recovery facility. '** 
William P. Gaughan, Director of the BSWD, in a letter to Professor 
Susskind, disagreed with that conclusion. Gaughan criticized the study 
for drawing general conclusions on a single case. He found the above 
quoted ccmnent " ••• unfair to the multitude of rm.micipal officials outside 
of the City of Haverhill who were not consulted for this case study. "*** 
*'Ihe Obstacles to Regional Resource Recovery ••• footnote, p.52. 
**Ibid p.52-. . 
**~illiam P. Gaughan, letter to Professor Larry Susskind, December, 1977. 
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'!here are a nunber of complex technical issues which need to be 
faced by local officials. '!he siting of a resource recovery facility 
may be one of the rrore oomplex. It is the view of the B.SWD that their role 
is to assist camnmities make these technically oomplex decisions in 
a disinterested manner. It is felt that with this type of preparation 
local officials will be rrore able to oope with the political problems 
which will inevitably arise.* 
In the case of Stoughton, the site which errerged from the 128 WRRC selection 
process, local officials are reasonably confident that there is sufficient 
political support for the town's host status. In its recomrendations 
to the full Council the 128 WRRC Technical Sub-oorrmi.ttee stated: 
*Ibid. 
Stoughton should be selected as the preferred 
site for the oonstruction of a large regional resource 
recovery facility. Each of the four nominated sites 
has problems that need to be dealt with, including 
Stoughton. '!he factor that causes the Technical 
Sub-corrmi.ttee to unanirrously recomrend this site is 
it has received public approval nore than once. A vote 
of Stoughton's Town Meeting rezoned the parcel of land 
east of Ibute 24 [for a resource recovery facility) • 
Another vote of [the] town rreeting granted the 
Industrial Developrent Financing Authority special 
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tpwer to approve financing for a resource recove:ry 
facility. 'Ihe fX?litical feasibility for use of this 
land appears to be well established.* 
4. 'Ihe Request for ProfX?sals 
After the site selection process was completed the BSWD and the 
.MITRE CorpJration prepared a Status Retort (which has been extensively 
cited in this p:iper) for the 128 W~. 'Ihis retort served ~major 
puqoses. 'Ihe first, as a tangible product which errbodied the 128 ~' s 
past accarplishrrents and outlined its approach to implerrEI'ltation. 
'Ihe second puqose it served was as a base for future activities both 
as a reference and a strategy document. 
The completion of the Status IefX?rt in Janua:ry, 1978 led to the 
next step in the implerrentation process, the developrent of a request 
for profX?sals (RFP). The 128 WRRC Technical Corrmittee with the assistance 
of the BSWD and the MITRE CorpJration, worked on this docurrent from 
Februa:ry 1978 to its issuance in August 1978. The following objectives 
were · ·~sued to establish the goal of regional resource recove:ry system: 
• Creation of an environrrentally sound 
waste disfX?sal alternative. 
• Maximization of recove:ry of energy and 
*128 w~ status IefX?rt, p.119. 
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ma.terials from nrunicipal solid waste. 
• Minimization of financial risk 
to particip:iting corrmunities. 
• Maximization of system reliability 
• Iegional economies of scale to 
achieve the lowest i:ossible disi:osal 
costs. 
•Minimal reliance on landfill.* 
A bidder's conference was held in August 1978 at which tine the 
RFP was distributed to i:otential bidders. At the tine this is being 
written there are several ma.jor resource recovery firrrs working on 
proi:osals which are due on March 16, 19 79. When proi:osals are 
received they will undergo a two stage evaluation by the 128 WRRC Technical 
Carmittee, with the assistance of the BSWD and other agencies of the 
Camonwealth, and the MITRE Cori:oration. Proi:osals are to ,,.be rated not S0lely 
on the basis of cost, but rather on several criteria. The first stage 
of the evaluation will consist of a screening of all proi:osals for: 
• Adequate Technical Plan 
o Adequate .Marketing Plan 
• Adequate .Managercent capability 
o Acceptable Schedule 
• Acceptable Financial Plan 
*'!he 128 WRRC Technical Ccmnittee, Camonwealth of Massachusetts, and the 
MITRE Cori:oration. "Project r:escription" t SUrmlary of RFP) . 
July f 1978 p. l. 
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• Adequate Envirorurental Quality 
• Acceptable Level of Exceptions to 
Prop:?sed Contract.* 
Those prop:?sals which successfully pass the initial screening will be 
further evaluated on the basis of nore detailed, weighted criteria. 
F.ach criterion will be on one o-f three levels: prime importance, 
m::xlerate irnp:>rtance, or lower irnp:>rtance. The following is a surnnary of 
sane of these weighted criteria: 
Examples of process design prop:?sal criteria are: 
soundness of plan for integration of equiµrent and processes 
(prime importance), capacity expansion capability (noderate 
irnp:>rtance), and operating and maintenance plan (lower 
irnp:>rtance) • 
Examples of criteria for the evaluation of envirorurental 
impacts are: extent of traf fie impact (prime irnp:>rtance) , 
safety design concepts (noderate irr{x>rtance), and quality 
and quantity of residue (lower irr{x>rtance). 
Examples of criteria for evaluating the qualifications 
and managerrent plan are: previous experience and performance 
(prime importance), oompliance with RFP conditions (noderate 
*The 128 WRRC Technical Ccrrmi ttee, the Connonweal th of Massachusetts, and 
'Ihe MITRE Corp::>ration. Iequest for Prop:?sals, August 1978, p.53. 
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irrp:>rtance), and construction schedule (lCMer 
irrp:>rtance). 
Exanples of criteri a for cost and pricing 
prq;osals are: net tipping fee [cost to corrmunities 
to disp::>se at the facility exclusive of transportation 
costs and less any revenues retUilled to corrmun.itie~ 
(prine irrp:>rtance), cbst escalation limitations 
(rroderate irrp:>rtance), and financial reporting and auditing 
procedures (lower irrp:>rtance).* 
FbllCMing the evaluation, a recormen.dation will be made to the 
full 128 WRRC. If there is rrore than one contractor with similarly 
high qualifications, the corrmunities them.selves may participate in 
negotiations with these firms prior to a final selection. 
When a finn is selected what may be the rrost difficult aspect of 
the implerrentation process begins - signing corrmunities up for long-
term contracts (20 years). l.Dcal officials can be expected to be 
naturally cautious when asked to make such a conmitment on behalf of 
their carnrunities to a technology with which rrost are unfamilar. 
IDng-tenn contracts between conmunities and the finn which owns 
and operates the facility (defined in the draft contract as the 
Full Service Cbntractor**)are necessary in order to assure that the 
*Ibid pp. 54-56 
**Ibid appendix A. 
conditions of their long-tenn financing obligations are net.* The 
following description of the highlights of a pro:i;:osed contract can 
serve to give an overall idea of the type of system 128 WRRC expects to 
procure: 
• 'Ihe Ag"reerrent will becorre effective when the 
facility has been tested and has net perfonnance 
requirerrents as set forth in the construction 
contract. 
• 'Ihe Contractor will operate and will maintain 
the facility up to the guaranteed plant 
capacity for the life of the contract. 
• 'Ihe Contractor will guarantee its contractual 
obligations under the cperating Agreement. 
• 'Ihe facility is guaranteed to rreet all 
present local, state and federal environ-
rrental standards. 
• Cormunities are required to guarantee 
minimum quantities of solid waste under 
the Agreerrent and to pay a fee for such 
guaranteed tonnage whether delivered or not. 
• F.ach camrunity will set its own mininrum 
*lbbert E. F.andol, Resource Iecovery Plant Implementation: Guides for 
Public Officials: Risks and Contracts U.S. Environrrental Protection Agency 
Publication S.W.-157.7 ·J.,976 p. 39. 
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tonnage guarantee after it has been 
established by the first year's weighing. 
• Cornrunities will receive a certain percent 
of the revenues f rorn the sale of energy 
and a certain percent of the net revenues 
from the sale of recovered rretals. 
• 'Ihe Agreerrent guarantees to the conmunities 
a minimum energy revenue credit per ton 
subject to adjustnent for changes in the 
value of energy. 
• Ccmrunities will share in fees paid by 
private haulers. 
• Capital and operating costs will be ba.sed on 
f inn bid prices quoted by the Contractor 
as of the date of the proposal. Except 
for inflation(based on an agreed-upon 
index), certain pass-through costs and 
legally mandated design or operating changes, 
any costs for construction and operation of the 
facility above the bid prices will be 
absorbed by the Contractor. 
• Conmunities have the right of "first refusal" 
for continuing service at the conlusion of the 
20 year tenn of the Agreerrent. 
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• Corrmuni ties will have joint representative 
to rronitor the perfonnance of the Contractor 
under the Agreenent. 
• Corrmunities may continue or establish 
source separation/recycling programs 
in accordance with the provisions of the 
Agreenent.* 
B. An Evaluation of the 128 WROC 
'Ihis section will examine the 128 WROC using the questions 
posed at the end of Chapter Four • There will be a discussion of 
1.. organizational fr~rk, 2. appropriateness of the level of 
organization, 3. avoidance of the dangers of a single mission authority 
and,4. an evaluation in teilil.S of Gross's list of advantages and 
disadvantages. / 
1. Organizational Fr~rk 
The organizational f rarre\\Drk of the 128 WRRC can be viewed as 
particularly suited to the stu.tuatory distribution of solid waste 
responsibilities ani powers in the Comronwealth of Massachusetts. 
The responsibility for solid waste disposal lies with each nrunicipality 
in the Comrronwealth.** BeoalJlSe there is no statuatory basis for them, 
regions :rrandated by the state are out of the question. 'llms, if the 
economies of scale of a regional project are to be realized, each 
commmity must individually decide to participate. 'Ihe 128 WRRC 
*The 128 WROC, Ccmronwealth of Massachusetts, and the MITRE Corporation, 
'l,Agreerrent Surmiary. " July 1978. 
**Evelyn F. Murphy, letter to William R. Adam.s, U.S. EPA Regional Administrator 
on "Agency Identification" as required by the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 dated May 8, 1978. Attached as Appendix 
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provides the frartEWOrk for these ccmnunities to i.nplerrent their 
decisions on oow to approach regional solid waste dispJsal. 
The B.SWD is the agency through which the Camonwealth nost 
directly participates in the process. 'Ihis agency acts as a · 
secretariat in such activities keeping records, arranging meetings, 
and assisting conmunications arrong member conmunities and with firms bidding 
on the project. It also provides technical assistance ooth in-house 
and through its consultant the MITRE CbrµJration. 
'lb sum up, the rrerrber conmunities bring with them the statuatory 
authority to supply theirnunicipal solid wastes over a b.elty year 
period to the project. They detennine the approach to solid waste 
dispJsal and1 by their collective voluntary participation, the extent 
of the region. The state provides technical assistance and organizational 
SUppJrt. 
Adequate p;:Mer does exist on an overall jurisdictional level. 
However, that p:>Wer resides in the individual rrember conmunities, rather 
than in sorre state or regional authority. 
2. Appropriate Level of Organization 
'Ihe 128 WRRC can be thought of as a region composed of a nurrber 
of independent, but cooperating units. The cooperation arrong these 
corrmunities allows them to avoid the relative high unit costs of solid 
waste dispJsal that would otherwise be incurred by each locality acting 
alone. 
'Ihe externalities of solid waste dispJsal are reduced by regionalization 
in that fewer facilities need be built (it is not unlikely that only 
one facility will be necessary to serve the needs of the entire 
128 WRRC area). A facility could negatively effect ooth the host 
J 
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commmity and adjacent commmities. 'Ihe host comnunity will be a rcember 
of the 128 WRRC and will, as such, have a vciiee in all decision ~ Beyond 
that, the host comrunity is given s:p=cial rights in Article 10. (d) 
of the 128 WRRC Bylaws: "Substantive ~asures directly affecting a host 
conmmity shall be subject to veto by the sole negative vote of the 
host corrmunity."* 
Adjacent commmities also are given the owartunity to join the 
128 WRRC if they are not already rrenbers. A . rrerrber comrunity has an 
input into the decision making process and can share in any benefits 
the project may produce. 'Illus, to the extent there is a :i;::otential 
for externalities, there is a ~chanism for dealing with them: the 
incori:oration of the affected comrunity into the decision-making group. 
The decision-making group may contain, and is limited to, only those 
comrunities who may be, :i;::ositively or negatively, directly affected 
by the project. 
3. Avoidance of a Single Mission Authority 
'!he 128 WRRC avoids the pitfalls of a single mission authority 
by virtue of its structure . It is coqosed of rrerrbers representing 
local units of general governrrent. As such, the ultimate decision-
makers are local officials or town ~etings who must weigh decisions 
regarding approaches to solid waste dis:i;::osal against all the other 
priorities a municipality rrust address. 
Rather than short-circuit the :i;::olitical process, as an authority 
*128 WRRC Status Re:i;::ort, Appendix A. 
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of the type Hudson describes :(Chapter III), the approach under discussion 
subjects regional resource recovery to the r:olitical processes of 
each of its rrarber ccmrunities. Rather than stifling local opr:osition, 
this approach is based on the local commmities making all of the 
decisions such as siting, selecting an approach to regional solid waste 
disr:osal, and selecting a technology arrl contJJactor. Preemption of 
local authority by the state does not becorre an issue since local 
gove.rnirent retains its r:ower and resr:onsibility to disr:ose of nrunicipal 
solid waste. 
4. Surrmary of the Advantages and Disadvantages of a Delocalized 
Approach 
Gross's list of advantages and disadvantages of a delocalized 
approach to solid waste disr:osal was quoted in Chapter III. It is 
now r:ossible to apply that list to the case of the 128 WRRC. 
a. Advantages 
(1). Economic - The 128 WRRC will benefit from the economies of 
scale this regional approach will bring. A regional base will also 
supr:ort the high capital investments needed for a resource recovery system. 
(2) Environmental - A regional base will supr:ort costly equiprent 
for the protection of the environment. A larger land base has allowed 
the 128 WRRC to select a suitable site. 
In addition, a regional system will allow rrenber connrunities to 
disr:ose of solid waste in an environmentally sound, rather than haphazard 
manner. 
(3) R:>litical and Social - Alth::mgh the private sector has a major 
role as owner and operator of a resource recovery system, in the 128 WRRC 
plan, they are only a part of a system which is answerable both to member 
J 
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corrmunities and the state. While solid waste disr:osal will not disappear 
as a local budget item, local officials will be dealing with a relatively 
stable price over a twenty year contract period. Facility siting will 
cease to be an issue for local officials once a regional facility(ies) 
is in place. In addition, a regional resource recovery system can 
prevent, according to Gross, the encroachrrent of "organized cri.rre" 
which is reputed to have taken over large segments of the private 
solid waste disr:osal market. 
b. Disadvantages 
(1) F.conomic - Gross minted out the costs associated with 
implementation may be high if objections to regionlization are raised. 
In the case of the 128 WRIC Qbj.ections to various aspects of the 
project, if not to regionalization. itself, can·cause. druays. After a 
contractor is selected the process of signing up enough ccmnunities to 
cxxnmit sufficient tonnage to begin construction i s . likely to 
be qUi te ti.Ire consuming, henre €:(ilstl y . 
Although transfer stations can add to protect costs and transr:ortation 
costs can be expected to rise, such costs will be nnre than offset by 
economies of scale which can be realized with a regional system. 
(2) Environmental - While a regional resource recovery system will 
concentrate the impacts of solid waste disr:osal, Gross was nnre concerned 
with the problems, such as leachate, associated with regional landfills. 
A resa.irce recovery system is not free of environ:rrental impacts such as 
air tnllution caused by the corrbustion of refuse and increased local 
truck traffic. These impacts however, can be -weighed against 
the impacts of alternatives such as a regional landfill or, especially 
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a number of local landfills in vacying states of compliance with 
environrrental regulations. 
In regulating the resource recovery systan to be used by the 
128 WRRC, the state regulato:ry agencies will not be dealing with a large 
quasi-irrlependent authority of the type ooth Gross and Hudson warn 
against. Instead a private sector oontractor will own and operate the 
systan subject to the enviro:nrrental regulations of the locality(ies) 
in which the facility(ies) is sited and the state. 
(3) Iblitical - G:ross's concern that local land use controls 
would be overridden is obviated by ·the approach of the 128 WRRC. 
The 128 WRRC siting process left this issue in the hands of the oost and 
other rrernber cornrunities. 
His other i:oli tical ooncern, that antagonism be~en sorre local 
governrrents and state or regional autlnrities would be aggravated is 
minimized since local governrrents are the ultinate decision makers in the 
128 WRRC. However, there will. be, no doubt, sorre antagonism on the part 
of sorre local officials and citizens who may view the 128 WRRC as a 
creature of the state. In a sense this view is correct in that regional 
resowce recovery groups such as the 128 WRRC are integral cornp:ments 
of the state's overall solid waste managerrent strategy. Regional resource 
recovery systems are prorroted by the state to provide alternatives 
to unsatisfacto:ry conventional disi:osal facilities. 'Ihe existence 
of such an alternative allows state regulators rrore flexibility in 
closing down inexpensive but unhealthy local facilities thus antagonizing 
local officials woo wish to oontinue solid waste disi:osal on the cheap. 
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(4) Social - A large regional authJrity is likely to be less 
open to public participation in rraking solid waste disi:osal and land use 
decisions. As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the 128 WROC 
approach is an atterrpt to maximize - the participation of local officials 
and interested members of the general public. 
C. Criticism of the Ccmronwealth of Massachusetts Approach 
The Obstacles to Regional Resource Iecovery: A Massachusetts 
Case Study by Larry Susskirrl and Richard Newcare was published in December, 
1977 as a part of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Environrrental 
Impact AssessIIEnt Project. 'lhe study focused on the Northeastern 
Massachusetts Resource Recovery Project to" ••• doCUIIEnt the technical 
and institutional obstacles to regionalization of resource recovery and 
to suggest strategies for overcoming existing barriers."* Susskind and 
Newcorre found that following questions to be especially i.rnµ:)rtant: 
(1) What role should state govemIIEnt play in enabling 
regionalization of solid waste :manageIIEnt? (2) 'lb what 
extent are local officials capable of handling the technical 
issues involved in choosing a resource recovery technology, 
selecting a site for a regional facility, and negotiating 
with the private contractors who build and operate resource 
recovery plants? (3) What sort of bargaining process is 
needed - to ensure equitable and efficient consideration of 
the environrrental, financial, and i:olitical concerns of the 
parties involved in any regional resource recovery project.** 
*The Obstacles to Regional Resource Recovery • • • p. 3 
**Ibid, p.3 
. 
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1. The Ible of the State 
Sussk.ind and Newcorre propose three nod.els of state involvement, all of 
which assume that the problem is of nore than local concern. The first, 
"Strong State Intervention", has the state specifUi ng regional boundaries, 
becoming directly involved in project financing, making regional disposal 
of nunicipal solid waste mandatory, and either siting facilities through 
the direct exercise of eminent domain or the authorization of regioru:;: 
to use this rrethod.* 
In states where the above rrethod is politically unacceptable, "Limited 
State Intervention" is a possibility. Under this approach the state \\Duld 
emp:JWer counties or cornnunities to form regional districts, encouraged to 
do so, perhaps, by state incentives. 'Ihe regions. \\Duld not necessarily 
have taxing power,. 'Ihey might, however, issue bonds and have the ability 
to negotiate with ccmnunities regard.0g compensation for hosting the plant. 
This approa~ , according to Susskind and Newcome, \\Dµld not require the 
Btate to assume any long-term risks in .financing new facilities** 
Both this and the first approach \\Duld no·t require that the state 
- . 
have a particular policy regarding the technology to be used.*** 
Susskind and Newcome feel that Massachusetts is following a third 
approach, "Indirect State Involverrent", in which it is assurred that the 
state has no right to force localities to participate in regional solutions. 
Here the state does not provide financing and land-taking powers remain with 
local governrrent. 'Ihey also assert that in this approach state agency 
*Ibid, p.53 
**.It- is not made clear who \\Duld assurre the long-term risks under this approach. 
***Ibid, pp. 53-54 
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officials " ••• are anxious to provide teclmical assistance as an indirect 
ireans of influencing local colaboration."* 
It is felt by these authors that .Massachusetts officials have a 
specific technological approach to solid waste disp:>sal and that the BSWD 
" ••• tilts state technical assistance in a particular direction. 
*Ibid, p. 54 
**Ibid, p. 55 
While the BSWD denies it, it appears to us that 
orx::e the state and its consultants beoorre involved, 
the question is no longer which rnanagerrent (including 
low-technology p:>ssibilities) might IPake the rrost 
sense for a particular region. 'Ille prediliction for 
a particular solution is not necessarily wrong (in 
northeastern .Massachusetts the state has endorsed 
a large-scale -- 3000 TPD ~ns per day] -- resource 
recovery~acility] ) but localities are being misled · 
if the off er of technical assistance has strings 
attached. 'Ille costs associated with particular waste 
disp:>sal technologies ought to be considered on a 
region-by-region basis. At the present tirre in 
.Massachusetts, it seems to us that inadequate consideration 
is being given to the full array of costs and 
benefits in each situation. The state ap~ars to 
be rroving inexorably toward the inplerrentation of 
its "high" technology plan, although in every case 
localities will decide "Whether or not to participate.** 
x 
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In William P. Gaughan's (Director of the BSWD) Decerrber 1, 1977 
letter to Professor Susskind cited earlier, this description of the 
Massachusetts approach is disputed. .. Mr. Gaughan feels that while 
oone of the rrodels exactly describe the Cormonwealth's approach, the 
second, "Limited State Intervention" is sorrewhat nore accurate than 
the third. In addition, he takes exception to the assertion that the 
state is atterrpting to influence local oomnunities to adopt a 
particular technological approach: 
That is in no way true. The approach 
selected in the Northeast Project was selected 
by those oomnunities, representatives not the 
state. The state is oot following that approach 
in other areas. One need only to look at the other 
projects which we are s1xmsoring to see that sare of the 
technical assistance we are providing is looking at and 
evaluating approaches, including low technology i::ossibilities ••• 
A fundarcental problem of why this misunderstanding [of the 
state's approach] exists is that this qtJUdy was limited 
to one situation in which a s:i;ecific approach has been 
selected by the co:rrmunities inmlved and which the Bureau 
of Solid Waste Disi::osal is aiding in irrplerrentation. 
'lb say that the same approach is being irrpleirented state-
wide is an ill-infoxne:i extrai::olation from a limite::1: study.* 
*letter to Professor Susskind 
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Susskind and Newcorre in fact have not substantiated their assertion 
that the state is attempting to i.mp:>se a particular approach throughout 
.Massachusetts. It does not appear this follCMS from the facts documented 
in the case study (which on the whole, seems reasonably accurate). Nor 
do the authors suggest why the state \\Ould want to pursue sur,h a i;olicy. 
In fact, the State Solid Waste Plan of Septerrber, 1977, (p. 20-) specifically 
states; "'Ihe selection of a particular technology and scale of operation 
is dependent ui;on a nurrber of factors which are specific to individual 
location or regions." 
2. I.ocal Technical caP3=city 
Susskind and NeWl'.X)rre criticized the Cornronwealth for not adequately 
preparing local officials to make difficult technical decisions. Part 
of this criticism is also ai1red at local officials for not being nore 
forceful in Challenging the technical judgerrents of the BSWD and the 
MITRE Cori;oration. Also, in their opinionf the environmental irrpact analyses 
could, on the one hand, have been done nore precisely and on the other 
been ?3-ckaged for relatively easy public conslll'llption. Finally, they feel 
that opi;onents of the project were able to nount effective opi;osition, 
because: " ••• the process had been nore or less sealed off ••• ..-*and the 
technical firrlings of the BSWD and the Greater Lawrence Solid Waste Cornnittee 
(the oxhinal name of the regional cornnittee ncM known as the Northeastern 
Solid Waste Carmittee NESWC). " ••• ~re vulnerable to charges that 
deals had been made or adequate study not completed."** 
*'Ihe authors make the exception of one the projects chief opi;onents, 
Dr. Gene Grillo (an environrrental advisor to the City of Haverhill) 
:who was given a special briefing and had access to all material 
sul:mitted by bidders. 
*'-*0bstacles Regicnal Resource Reoovery ••• p. 62. 
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The authors feel that a greater effort should have been made to educate 
local representatives, allowing them to rebut such charges with greater 
authority.* 
Mr. Gaughan's letter refutes these argurrents. First, it is, 
he feels, irrpJssible to make local officials experts in every phase of 
the project. "They must defer at sorre point to the expertise of other 
officials and consultants they k:nCM to be impartial." I..ocal representatives 
were, according to Gaughan, given every opportunity to challange any 
assumption made by the BSWD and MITRE, and to have those assumptions 
changed if there were justification. The letter goes on to assert 
that the BSWD and MITRE did a "state-of-the-art" analysis of all 
factors and offers to consider any specific recoimEI1dations to improve 
the process. Gaughan states that " ••• (e)very effort was made to 
provide all interested parties with as much info:rmation as they were 
willing to absorb".** 
The criticism that local officials were not sufficiently prepared 
to handle the complexities of a project such as the lt>rtheastern 
Massachusetts Resource Recx:>very Project appears to be at least in part 
justified. Certainly, if local officials were rrore technically 
expert it would allow them rrore independence in choosing an approach to 
solid waste disposal and assessing proposals. As a practical matter, 
however, there is a limit to the nurrber of areas in which a public official, 
citizen, or professional person can be infonred in great depth. That 
is why specialists exist. It is the obligation of such specialists 
*Ibid. pp. 62-63 
;'*letter to Professor Susskind. 
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whose duty it is to work in the public interest either directly such 
as the staff of the BSWD, or indirectly such as the non-profit MITRE 
Cbqx:>ration, to provide technical assistance in a disinterested manner. 
The Cornronwealth's approach to regional resource recovery was 
designed to be as open as :i;:ossible. There are, oowever,a limited 
number of the public who are interested in involving themselves 
directly. Arrong those who are, individuals rrost often have limited 
anounts of tirrE and limited technical backgrounds. It is i.rnpJrtant, nevertheless 
for the state to continue vigorously pursuing their :i;:olicy of 
rnaximizing the level (toth in tenl1S of numbers and quality) of local 
participation and understanding of the process. 
3. The Bargaining Process 
There are several aspects of the bargaining process that, according 
to Susskind and Newcome, soould be rrodified to make it toth rrore 
equitable and efficient: 
a. The number of groups and individuals invited to participate 
soould be expanded to include envirorurental groups, business interests, 
ab.ltters,and others -who nay be directly or indirectly affected or 
interested. Inclusiveness, they feel, is in the long-nm rrore 
effective than exclusiveness. 
b. The participants in the negotiations soould have rrore to say 
in specifying the scope and character of the technical analysis, rather 
than have this process treated as the sole province of technicians and 
professionals. 
c. The E:nvirorurental Impact Review Process should be an integral 
part of the bargaining process rather than " 
fact coore." 
treated as an after-the-
d. "rvbre flexible techniques for compensating individuals 
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and groups adversely affected by regional facilities probably ought 
to develop." These carpensation costs should be shared on a regional 
basis." Although the exact compensation due each individual may 
not be rx>ssible to calculate, it ~uld be rx>ssible to estirtla.te the 
social costs l:x>rne by various groups. Those groups and individuals 
not satis;Eied by various fo:rms of compensation will continue to 
rrount various fo:rms of oprx>sition, butthe arrount of sympa.thy they 
generate will be severely limited.* 
Again, Gaughan rejects the implication that the bargaining process 
was closed. There was always, he claims, every effort made to 
encourage the max.ircum:rarticipation l:x>th in negotiations and technical 
evaluation. Gaughan also feels that the rerormendation that the 
Environrrental Impact Review process be made a part of the bargaining 
process, " ••• was attempted within the limits of the state of the 
art with regard to environrrental analysis and public participation."** 
In the case of the 128 WROC,for exarrple,there is significant 
opposition to using the Stoughton site arrong citizens and officials 
in the neighl:x>ring Town of Pandolph. Randolph had originally rejected 
an invitation to join the 128 WROC. Eventually, hcMever, tcMn 
officials were apparently convincerl that they had rrore leverage ~rking 
within the 128 WROC. 'Ihey are currently rrerrbers and are represented 
by one of the rrost vocal citizen oprx>nents of the project. 
The issue of carpensation for individuals or groups adversely 
inlp3.cted by a resource recovery system deserves closer examination. 
*Obstacles to Regional Resource Recovery pp. 70-72 
**letter to Professor Susskind. 
-67-
Susskind and Newa:>rre have apparently assurred that such a system will 
have significant adverse effects uron individuals and groups in the region. 
What those impacts might be, and the rretlxxls to be used to determine an 
equitable CX>mpensation are not specified. 
4. Irrplcts and Compensation 
In their study, Assessing the Environrrental Impacts of Resource 
Recovery Facilities,* Craig Miller and Michael B. Bever identify several 
types of impacts relevent to the assessrrent of Resource Recovery facilities: 
air quality, water quality, land use, +-..raffic. t,errestr.ial and aquatic 
biology, aesthetics, net energy efficiE'r.cy, f'esidue, and materials efficiency 
In the Draft Environrrental Inpact RefX)rt on the Northeastern 
Massachusetts Resource Re<X>very Project each of these areas is examined. 'Ihe 
rerort shows the prorosed project to be clearly a better choice than a 
no action alternative (see chart p. 6Bl ). Of the probable impacts 
listed four are CX>nsidered adverse: emissions to atnosphere, increased 
truck traffic, visual impact, and rotential leachate production from 
residue disrosal.** 
'Ihe Environrrental :rrrpact RefX)rt makes the case t hat tli.es~ ;:irl.verse 
impacts can be <X>ntrolled so as to make their effects ne~ligli~le 'Ihere 
are a number of reasons · for this such as : l. such ,a facility produces 
energy displacing an equivalent a!rbunt of energy which would othenvise 
be produced by a conventional fossil fuel plant, 2. there are significant 
environrrental impacts associated with the no action option, and 3. 
appropriate rollution <X>ntrol deviees will keep such impacts as air rollution 
*Environrrental Assessrrent Project, Lal::oratory of Architecture and Planning, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1978. 
**Draft Environrrental Impa.ct Rep:?rt ••• p. 280~ 
SUMMARY OF BENEFICIAL AND ADVERSE IMPACTS OF PROPOSED PRUJtCT VERSUS NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Pro.J!..O~ed PrQJ.ect No Action Alternative 
Beneficial Impacts Adverse Impacts Beneficial Impacts Adverse lmpa cts 
recovers energy and materials • emissions to atmosphere • low atmospheric emissions at • large land requirement 
lower overall energy demand • increased truck traffic 
remote landfills 
• extensive ground and surface 
minimum land requirement • retention of local autonomy water pollution 
elminates dependence upon • visual impact • creation of odors and potential 
landfill • potential leachate production 
explosions 
lower overall envirormental fran residue disposal • potential for rodents and vector 
impact problems 
minimum potential of water .. dumpin~ outdoors (noise, unsight-liness pollution . 
political difficu11ties reliable system with redundancy • 
and back-up • difficulties of expansion 
dumping indoors • potential fire hazard 
centralized operation • heavy local truck traffic 
sterile final residue • inefficient use of equipment and 
operates independent of weather personnel 1n refuse transport and 
conditions di.spo,sal 
,,, ..••• ,,, ~,·~·· ••• ,, •• , I 
min1m1zes health hazard from air-
borne micro-organisms . 
efficient refuse transport ., I .. . . 
through use of transfer stations I 
From: Draft Environrrental Impact Rei;ort on the Northeastern Massachusetts Resource 
Recovery Project, June 1978, p. 280 
! 
I 
I 
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00 
I 
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and noiSe' only marginally higher than arcbient levels. 
Appropriate siting can keep irrpacts on abutters to a~ •. By locating 
resource recovery facilities in industrial areas, aesthetic irrpacts are 
reduced. Traffic problems caused by trucks serving the facility are 
minimized by siting near major highways with direct access to these 
arteries. In both the 128 WRRC prof:X)sed site in Stoughton and the 
NESWC site in North Andover these conditions are net and so irrpacts 
on abutters can be expected to be minimal. 
It is f:X)Ssible to make a case that a major irrpact of a resource 
rerovery facility is psychological. Gross quotes a study which found 
that in the case of landfills, a" ••• person's disf:X)sition to approve 
the prof:X)sed landfill is related to his beliefs about its consequences ••• " 
The study found these beliefs often were not changed by factual evidence. 
'lllere was noted an inability " ••• to truly convert a person whose attitude is 
enotionally anchor~."* 
Susskind and Newrorre themselves quote one other major opf:X)nents of 
the Haverhill site, Representative Francis J. Bevilaqua, as claiming such a 
plant ~uld bring "rats as as big as dogs' to the city.** Such an errotional 
staterrent has nothing to do with a well operated solid waste disf:X)sal 
facility but is often typical of what t.."'1.e public believes. 
One should not uncritically accept the conclusions of the Draft 
Environrrental rmpact Rep::>rt. However, it d6es call to question what, if 
any, of the irrpacts of these facilities need to be ca:npensated for, to whom 
should corrp:msation go, and by what fo:rmula(s) should the kind and 
*J. R. Sheaffer, G. S. 'lblley, Z. Preewinkle, J. Havlicek, Jr., G. Davis, 
Y. Wang, H. Bonus, F. L. Strodtbeck, B. Madsen, c. Haller, and R. Bulatao. 
Decision Making and Solid Waste DiSJ'.:X)sal. Center for Urban Studies, 
University of Chicago, Chicago, 1971. Quoted in Issues in the Regionalization 
of Solid Waste Managerrent Planning, p. 116 
**'llle Obstacles to Regional Resource Recovery ••• p. 37 
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arrount of compensation be detennined. 
Studies such as " 'Not or IT!Y Block You lbn' t' : Facility Si ting and the 
Strategic ImpJrtance of Canpensation" by Michael O'Hare* have examined 
compensation as a tool for siting what he refers to as "locally noxious 
facilities." O'Hareis OJncerned with facilities which are "perceived 
(If!Y emphasis) as locally noxious: noisy (airfX)rt) , srrelly (solid··wa5te 
recycling) , ugly (oil refinery) , scary (prison) , or otherwise disagreeable 
to its irrrrediate neighbors."** 
O'Hare seems to be as IIUch concerned with perceived as actual impacts. 
(He does not support with any evidence the assertion that solid waste 
recycling is srrelly. Open dumps and poorly run landfills are srrelly. 
Clearly;this is a case of guilt by association.) It is his contention 
" ••• that compensation for local sufferers is not only an equitable 
desideratum, as has long been recognized, but a strategic necessity for 
aligning critical actors' interests with the public interest."*** 'Ihus, 
compensation should be considered for use as a :rrethod for overcoming opposition 
to facilities regardless of their actual impacts, ·1ccording to O'Hare. 
A study by Brian C. Mellea, of regional resource recovery corrmittees 
also stressed the i.n;:ortance of canpensation as an aid to siting resource 
recovery plants. Mellea makes the assumption that there will be adversely 
affected abutters. He suggest that compensation could include rroney, extra 
votes on the conmittee, control over truck routing or plant operation 
and that the arrount of rroney given to the host COil1tlUility in lieu of taxes . 
*Public Policy, Volurre 25, No. 4 (Fall 1977) pp. 407-458. 
**Ibid, p. 409. 
***Ibid, p. 414 
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be exactly specified. NESWC is cited as an exarrple of a comnittee which 
has made such a specification. 'Ihe arrount, according to M=llea, should 
be specified so that corrmunities can 'better weigh hosting costs against 
benefits.* 
'Ihe Cormonwealth of Massachusetts provides canpensation to host 
camumities through a one dollar fee in lieu of taxes, to be paid by the 
privat e o~rator of. a resource recovery facility.** State law 
establishes. p:iyTieI1t as that arrount,therefore, any change
1 
in the corrpensation fo:rmila 'WOuld have to care through legislative 
action. Since the one dollar per ton fee is an operating expense the 
private contractor passes on to each rrember cormrunity, there are rrore 
corrmunities which 'WOuld stand to lose fran an increase in the fee than 
'WOuld gain, making the enactrcEnt of such legislation unlikely. 
In examining the Massachusetts approach to compensation it can be 
assumed that there would be ~ general reasolils for providing it: 1. there 
is a rroral obligation to corrpensate ccmrunities and individuals who 
may be in some way affected by a facility,and 2. compensation can be 
useful in gaining ~lie acceptance for a facility. In the first cas e , 
it has yet to be established who 'WOuld be injured, to what extent, 
and what an equitable :payment should be. If the fear of the impacts 
of a resource recovery facility is based uµm erroneous perceptions, the 
type and arrount of compensation becares even rrore problematical. In the 
case of the host connunities of North Andover (NESWC) and Stoughton 
*Brian c. ~~llea, 'Ihe Effectiveness of Regional Conmittees in Irnplerrenting 
Regional Resource Recbvery Programs. Environrrental Impact Assessnent 
Project, Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, February 1978. 
**Chapter 16, Section 24A of the General raws of Massachusetts. 
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(128 WRRC), it appears that the fee, host OOrrm.mity veto, and control of 
such items as truck traffic patterns, has been sufficient to gain political 
acceptance for the facility, making additional forms of canpensation, so 
fart unnecessary. 
It should oot be assurred that political acceptance will remain stable 
over tine. NESWC's experience with the shifting attitudes in Haverhill 
regarding their host status should disabuse one of that idea. In the 
case of the 128 WRRC's Stoughton site, political acceptance appears to 
be solid. The project however, is not without local opponents. 'Ihere 
is a group within Stoughton who have put an anti-resource recovery 
referendum on the ballot. 'Ihere is also the very real threat of an 
attempt by the neighboring 1™11 of Randolph to block the construction 
of a resource recovery .system by legal :rceans. 
Sorre of the studies cited in this section have assurred, a priori, that 
a resource recovery plant is a nuisance facility with specific negative 
impacts that should be canpensated for. Before a system of canpensation 
is adopted, hcMever, further study should explore the nature of the 
impacts, who they huri;r an.1 specificalfy h::>w canpensation should be used (or 
whether it need not be used) to ameliorate their effects. 
Orrrent Massachusetts projects, such as the 128 WRRC, have the . 
fleXibility to respond to specific situations in which sorre fonn of 
special cx:>nsideration or canpensation might be called for to facilitate 
public acceptance. While the anount of financial ccrnpensation to the 
host CX>ImlUility is set by law, regioral groups can make necessary accormodations ' 
to affected groups, irrlividuals,ormunicipalities on a case by case basis. 
I. '!he Massachusetts Approach 
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Chapter V 
Conclusions 
Al.though the intention of the Massachusetts Legislature in rejecting 
mandatory :regionalization nay have been primarily the protection of horre 
rule perogatives, that action, in the long run, nay work to the benefit 
of regional resource recovery in the state. As discussed earlier in this 
paper, there are disadvantages to the state preerrpting local solid waste 
disrx:>sal authority which are avoided by encouraging local governrrents 
to fonn voluntary regional solid waste management organizations. However, 
this approach is not without drawbacks. 
One of the rrost difficult problems organizations such as the 128 
WRRC have to overcorre will be convincing the leaders of their respective 
comrunities to corrmit their mmicipalities to twenty year contracts. If the 
experience to date of NE.SWC is any indication, conmunities will be reluctant 
to be the first to sign these long-term agreements. Up until that rx:>int 
decisions are made byrepresentativesto the regional conmittee. 
Even difficult decisions such as siting and choice of contractor can be 
settled by a conmittee. Even though siting will involve rx:>litical decisions 
on the part of a few rrember ccmrunities, only one or two towns need agree 
to accept host status. '!he actual conmi tnent to long-term contracts will 
involve separate rx:>litical decisions in each of the rrernber towns. 
It nay for instance, be decided that 1,500 tons per day of rmmicipal 
solid waste must be conmitted before a facility can be constructed. That 
may involve a conmitnent on the part of as many as twenty or thirty localities. 
- 74 -
'!his can be expected to take a gocxl deal of tine and persuasive effort on the part of 
the regional conmi ttee and their sp:)Ilsors in the Bureau of Solid Waste Disposal. 
'lhis difficulty appears to be inherent in an approach1predicated on local 
hare rule. 
Another difficulty with the approach is that localities which delay 
in making a decision to comnit their solid waste to a regional facility 
rray find them.selves out in the cold. A system will be oonstructed to serve a limited 
arcount of solid waste tonnage. 'lhis arcount will be les.s than the total p:>tential 
tonnage of the region since it is assumed that sorre localities will be slow to comnit 
them.selves to the facility. In order to begin construction in a reasonable 
arcount of tine, a minimum arcount of tonnage will be specified. When that 
arcount is signed-up it will trigger ground breaking. 'Illus, the coverage 
of voluntary regionalism can be sp:>tt¥. Again, the problem of incomplete 
coverage is inherent in an approach which depends up:>n a great many separate 
p:>liticaldecisions being made. 
'llle complexity of a resource recovery project, not only in purely 
technical terms, but also in terms of financial, contractual, and 
institutional considerations make regional resource recovery systems a 
quite difficult issue for local governrrent to deal with. 'llle need for 
local officials to rely on expert advice in such rratters is not unusual 
since many of the issues they deal with have technical derrensions beyo:l}d 
their expertise. IDcal officials need not be experts in solid waste 
disp:>sal nor, indeed, in education,highway maintenance, or any other aspect 
of local governrrent in order to make sound decisions·based up:>n expert 
• 
advice. "What is necessary is that a regional comni ttee, and, if they wish 
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local oonm.mi ties obtain cmipetent and disinterested consultants to give 
them such advice. 
Even though there are a number of problems involved with the Massachusetts 
approach to regional solid waste disr:osal, its advantages justify its 
use. It all<Ms each local cannunity maxim.mt freedom to choose how it will 
disr:ose of its waste (given the increasing enforcerenteffort of the DD;JE). 
At the sane tine it all<Ms each corrmunity to share the advantages a regional 
resource recovery system can offer, wi th:mt imposing the disadvantages 
r:osed by rrandatory regions controlled by state or regional authorities. 
Siting, as in the 128 WRRC experience,becorres a self-selection process 
when one or rrore localities recognize the advantages of host status 
can outweigh any disadvantages. 'Ihus, siting is not a matter of the 
imposition of an unwanted facility by an external authority, but an 
act by a r:otential host cormunity in its own self-interest. 
The .Massachusetts approach to regional resource recovery is one which 
emerged frcm the particular r:olitical context of the state. Cbunties _are 
vestigial. Regional planning agencies (RPA' s) are without implerrention 
:i;:owers, (although several of them have served useful roles in assistinq 
regional corrmittees :by providing data and helping with pubic participation) • 
In the case of both counties and RPA's , their boundaries are not necessarily 
congruent with a r:olitically, or economically optimal region. 'Ihis leaves 
the state and the local governrrents as primary actors in defining regions 
for the p.lI'IX)ses of resource recovery. 
As was related in Qiap.ter II, the attanpt to impose mandatory 
regions on the state failed. 'Ihe reason for this failure was, primarily, 
the r:olitical :r;:ower of hone rule in .Massachusetts. 'Ihis forced state 
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officials to fo:rnulate a new approach to regional resource recovery based 
upon the responsibility of each rrunicipali ty of the state to dispose of their 
own solid waste. While there are the inherent difficulties in this approach 
that are discussed in this chapter, there is reason to believe that they 
are outweighed by its advantages, which include: 
• Greater flexibility to respond to the needs of each of the 
region's rrernber carmunities. 'Ihis responsiveness is related to the fact 
that rrernber c:onnunities collectively IPake the ultimate decisions. 
• Siting is facilitated by having rrernber comnunities propose 
potential sites. 
• Decisions are made by officials who are responsible for all 
phases of local govenurent. 'Ihus, potential excesses of single purpose 
authorities are avoided. 
• '!he approach is open and inclusive. All who exi;ect either to 
benefit or be ha.nred by a project can be represented in the deci..§i6n-IPaking 
process. 
B. Pecoimendations 
'Ihe reco:rrrrendations of this section do not propose 11\3.jor shifts in 
state policy. Such shifts rould be expected to be politically difficult, 
if at all possible1 and to have dubious practical results. Rather,these 
reconnendations point to areas of the state approach which receive spee~al 
attention as the attempt to i.rrplem:mt regional projects proceed. 
One of the rrost important tasks that advocates of regional projects have 
is to persuade local officials that the long-term interests of their 
camunuties will be well served through a regional resource recovery system. 
A 11\3.jor itr.pecli.ffi:mt in IPaking this case is the limited anount of practical 
-77-
experience in this field. Although there is a successfully operating facility 
in Saugus Massachusetts, none of the state s:i;:onsored projects has as 
yet broken ground. It will be imfortant for officials of the BSWD and 
individuals who participate ~in the regional groups to make a convincing 
case for these projects to the rrember conmunities. Increasing :regulatory 
pressure on the part of the DEx;JE can be expected and this too should help 
to induce conmunities to favorably consider an alternative that premises 
to deliver,at a relatively low and stable cost, an environrrentally 
acceptable rreans of dis:i;:osing of municipal solid wastes. 
Unless it can be shown in future sitlldies tbatthere are significant 
negative impacts on abutters of a :resource recovery facility, the issue 
of ccmpensation will remain a problematical one. So far, the one dollar 
per ton payrrent to host camnmities and the special weight their voiees : 
carry in making decisions regarding the project, appear to be sufficient 
to secure :i;:olitical acceptability. In the absence of evidence that particular 
hann is caused to abutters assuming the facility is well sited, also 
assuming the conmunity as a whole benefits from the facility, then it can 
be asstnred that equity considerations have been rret. 
If the regional decision-rnald.J}Jprocess remains open, it can be a 
rrore flexible, effective, equitable tool than a predetermined fontn.lla 
for compensation. 'Ihus, it is imfortant that :i;:otentially affected 
individuals, groups, and units of governrrent retain access to this 
process. 
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